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IV. JURISDICTION 
Molyneux and Huber do not contest this court's jurisdiction and concur with 
Heartwood's statement of jurisdiction. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Molyneux and Huber believe the issues are better stated as; did the trial court err 
when it granted summary judgment and did the trial court err when it granted the Rule 11 
Utah R. Civ. P. motion and awarded attorneys' fees? 
The standard of review for evaluating Rule 11 sanctions involves includes "( 1) 
findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions 
are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and amount of 
sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. 
Packer, 1999 UT 5, ~ 10, 973 P.2d 422. 
Summary judgment presents questions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). 
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These issues are reserved for appeal in the memoranda and trial court's respective 
orders. [R297, 508, 555, 584, 625, 697] 
VI. PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; Rule 52, Utah R. Civ. P.; Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. Each 
of these is included in Molyneux and Huber's Addendum. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action whereby Heartwood sought damages and an injunction from 
Employees after they left its employ and went to work elsewhere. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This matter was filed in the Third District Court on November 1, 2012. [R 1] 
During the summer of 2013, the depositions of the parties were taken and the fact 
discovery cutoff ran on August 12, 2013. [R 38] On October 15, 2013, Molyneux and 
Huber submitted their Rule 11 Motion to Heartwood's counsel under the safe harbor 
provision of Rule 1 l(c)(l)(A). [R 441] On November 8, 2013, Molyneux and Huber filed 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. [R 297-314]. 
After briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted Molyneux and Huber's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and dismissed Heartwood's claims against Molyneux and Huber. 
[R 584] See Appellant's Brief at 21. At the hearing on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Heartwood advised the Court and Molyneux and Huber, for the first time, after 
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Molyneux and Huber had briefed and prepared argument, that it was dropping all claims 
against Molyneux and Huber other than the claims that Huber had solicited employees 
and that Molyneux had solicited patients. [R 585, 1056] See also Appellant's Brief at 21. 
Molyneux and Huber' Rule 11 Motion was then heard and granted. [R467, 679-684] In 
ruling on each of the motions the trial court's order contained the court's own multi-page 
explanation of reasoning as contemplated by Rule 52, Utah R. Civ. P. [R584-590, 679-
684] 
Heartwood then appealed the Rule 11 ruling to this court. The court held that it did 
not have jurisdiction over that appeal and that appeal was rejected at Heartwood Home 
Health & Hospice v. Huber, 2016 UT App 183. [R762-770] 
After the matter was returned to the trial court, Molyneux and Huber filed a 
suggestion of death as to Mr. Nielson. [R776] The remaining defendant, Good Shepard 
Home Care & Hospice, Inc. was dismissed on an order to show cause. [R 978]. Once final 
orders were entered as to all parties, Heartwood filed this appeal on March 13, 2017. 
[R985] 
C. DISPOSITION BELOW 
Heartwood's claims against Employees were dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits in response to Employees' Motion for Summary Judgment. [R580] Attorneys' fees 
were then awarded to Employees in response totheir Rule 11 Motion. [R697] 
D. RELEVANT FACTS 
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During the summer of2012, Molyneux and Huber worked for Heartwood as a 
registered nurse (RN) (Huber) and a home health aide (Molyneux). [R14-15] Defendant 
Merrill Nielson was also employed as an RN. [R15] Prior to filing this action, Heartwood 
learned that Nielson had left its employ and Heartwood supposedly had video tape of 
Nielson making photocopies of its records prior to his departure. [R341] Despite 
Heartwood's promise to produce the video at page 76 of Heartwood's deposition, it was 
never produced [R341] and there were no substantiated allegations that either Huber or 
Molyneux took Heartwood records. See Heartwood's Opening Brief at page 24. These 
were among the allegations Heartwood dismissed during the summary judgment hearing. 
[R585] 
The defendants noticed the deposition of Heartwood under Rule 30(b)(6), Utah R. 
Civ. P. and the notice advised that the deposition would include questions relating to the 
allegations of the complaint pertaining to each defendant. [RJl 7-19] In Heartwood's 
deposition, defense counsel went through the factual allegation paragraphs one at a time 
and asked Mr. Vasic, Heartwood's president and designated Rule 30(b)(6) witness, about 
the facts which supported the allegations. These are summarized at [R557-580]. In 
virtually ever instance, Vasic responded that there were no facts supporting the 
allegations or that the allegations was just assumptions. [R328-352] 
Mr. Vasic further testified that Ms. Molyneux did not recruit Heartwood's patients 
before she left Heartwood's employ. [R300, 349]. Mr. Vasic ' s testimony was distilled in 
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Molyneux and Huber's memorandum supporting their Rule 11 motion to show that in at 
least 22 instances he testified that Heartwood had no facts to support key elements of its 
case. [R557-560] 
In the deposition of Heartwood, defense counsel further asked Vasic about the 
legal basis for its claims and was told they were based on the contracts and on HIP AA. 
[R345-52]. 
Molyneux resigned from Heartwood's employ on October 19, 2012. [Appellant's 
Brief at 15. Huber had left at the end of July. [R403] Anything Molyneux and Huber did 
which Heartwood claims to form the basis for its complaint occurred after they left 
Heartwood's employ. Brief page 20. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly sanctioned Heartwood under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. and 
awarded attorneys fees against it. By the time th~ Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., Motion was 
filed, it was clear that the allegations of the complaint made on information and belief had 
no support. It was further obvious that Heartwood's President had completely undercut 
virtually every substantive allegation by his deposition testimony in which he stated that 
there were no facts to support them. 
Rule 11 requires counsel and parties to be aware of the support for their allegations 
and to modify their pleadings and/or other papers when it appears they lack support. 
Filing papers which lack support and advocating positions which lack supporl each 
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violate Rule 11 Utah R. Civ. P., and may subject offenders to sanctions. 
Where a party takes a firm position in its Rule 30(b)(6) Utah R. Civ. P. deposition, 
it may not undercut that testimony with sham affidavits. There are at least three different 
points at which a party being deposed may take steps to assure that its testimony is 
correct. Failing to take advantage of those steps will leave the party bound by its 
testimony. 
Molyneux and Huber were awarded attorneys' fees by the trial court for their 
efforts in the Motion for Summary Judgment. Because they were awarded attorneys' fees 
by the trial court they are entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. RULE 11 
1. HEARTWOOD MISSTATES THE RULE 
At page 37 of Heartwood's Opening Brief, it argues for its interpretation of Rule 
11 Utah R. Civ. P. It purports to tell us what the rule says. 
"This is because the plain language of Utah's Rule 11 only authorizes 
sanctions for "presenting" a document in violation of the Rule: 
By presenting a pleading ... to the court ... an attorney ... 
is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances ... the allegations and other factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. 
[Emphasis added] 
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Utah R.Civ. P. 11 (b )." 
In reality Rule 1 l(b) Utah R. Civ. P. reads somewhat differently. The introductory 
portion of Rule 11 (b) actually says is the following. 
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court 
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, [Emphasis added] 
The omission of the term "or advocating" by the use of ellipses is not insignificant 
here. One of the methods by which Molyneux and Huber claim Heartwood violated Rule 
l l(b) Utah R. Civ. P. was by counsel advocating a baseless position in response to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Submission of the opposing memorandum and counsel's 
affidavit included signing, filing, submitting and advocating, and thus presenting an 
"other paper" including advocating the content of that memorandum. 1 Then, arguing, at 
oral argument, the contents of those documents was an additional instance of advocating. 
By the intentional excision of the operative language from Rule l l(b) Utah R. Civ. 
P. Heartwood has clearly, and intentionally, misstated the law. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES UNDER RULE 11 
In analyzing Heartwood's arguments on Rule 11, it helps to consider the state of 
the litigation at the time the Motion was heard by the trial judge. 
a. Heartwood had filed a complaint in which a number of its allegations were 
1The use of counsel's affidavit raises the question of whether he is now barred from 
representing Heartwood by the provisions of Rule 3.7 Utah R. Prof I Conduct. 
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pled on "information and belief." [RI 6-19] 
b. Heartwood's counsel had sat through the depositions of Molyneux and 
Huber where they had denied stealing clients or Heartwood's employees. [R394, 417] 
c. Heartwood's President had testified adversely to his cause on at least 25 
substantive points. [R557-560] 
d. The damaging testimony of Heartwood's President had not been corrected 
or softened as allowed by Rule 30(e),Utah R. Civ. P. [R322-355} 
e. Molyneux and Huber's counsel had sent Heartwood's counsel a Rule 11 
Motion availing his clients of the 21 day safe harbor provision of the rule, asking that 
Molyneux and Huber be dismissed from the suit and advising that a Summary Judgment 
Motion would follow unless Heartwood dismissed Molyneux and Huber. [Rl 106] 
Notwithstanding this background, Heartwood takes the position that it needed to 
do nothing· because it thought it had a case a year before when it filed suit. - · : 
The thrust of Heartwood's position is that once a complaint is filed which 
minimally meets Rule 11 's standard, a party and its counsel are free from Rule 11 's 
obligations regardless of what happens thereafter. Heartwood's position ignores the 
language of the rule and its interpreting case law. Rule 1 l(b) Utah R. Civ. P. describes the 
scope of the rule as" ... presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court 
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating) ... " Filing a complaint is not the 
sole triggering event. Filing any pleading, written motion, or "other paper" suffices. In 
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this case those "other papers" certainly include Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (R464), and other various papers signed by 
Heartwood's counsel thereafter. After the Vasic Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Heartwood's 
counsel was aware of the complete lack of evidence to support Heartwood's claims, and it 
became his obligation to dismiss the complaint against Molyneux and Huber or deal with 
the consequences. 
The determination of whether an action violates Rule 11 is an objective inquiry. 
Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); Kaplan v. 
DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331F.3d1251, 1255 (11th Cir. Fla. 2003). Heartwood's 
counsel's view that he thought all was well is insufficient. Another competent lawyer 
and/or judge would also need to be believe the case could survive. The trial judge here 
did not. 
Heartwood's argument also focuses on the time at which the Rule 11 motion was 
submitted. See Heartwood's opeining brief at 34-35. The relevant date for this discussion 
is the date on which Heartwood's right to amend its deposition answers ran which was 
September 19, 2013. [R322] Heartwood received Molyneux and Huber's Rule 11 Motion 
on October 15111 [R563]. 2 
Heartwood suggests its actions were reasonable in light of the limited time it had 
2Heartwood's discussion about the timing of the Rule 11 Motion is contained at pages 34-
3 5 of its Opening Brief. The timing of the Rule 11 Motion was not raised before the trial court 
and has not been reserved for appeal. [R602-620] 
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to prepare the complaint in order to stop the transfer of its clients. Again, the correct time 
to consider was October 15, 2013. The complaint in this matter was filed on November 1, 
2012. Heartwood's Rule 30(b)(6) Utah R. Civ. P. deposition was taken on August 22, 
2013. Heartwood had almost two full months to digest the testimony its president had 
given on its behalf. Heartwood made no corrections to the deposition during the 28 days 
allowed by Rule 30(e), Utah R. Civ. P. [R322] 
3. UTAH 11 RULE SUPPORTS MOLYNEUX AND HUBER 
Federal Advisory Committee notes on 1993 amendments previously suggested; 
"[ o ]rdinarily the motion should be served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, 
and, if delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely." Utah's version of Rule 11 tracks 
the federal rule. This clearly shows that signing post-complaint papers may be the basis 
for a motion. 
The note to the federal 1993 amendment addressed this issue further. 
The certification with respect to allegations and other factual 
contentions is revised in recognition that sometimes a litigant may have 
good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may need discovery, 
formal or informal, from opposing parties or third persons to gather and 
confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation. Tolerance of factual 
contentions in initial pleadings by plaintiffs or defendants when specifically 
identified as made on information and belief does not relieve litigants from 
the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into the facts that is 
reasonable under the circumstances; it is not a license to join parties, make 
claims, or present defenses without any factual basis or justification. 
Moreover, if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the party has a duty 
under the rule not to persist with that contention. [emphasis added]. 
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Other courts which have addressed this issue also take the position advocated by 
Molyneux and Huber. 
[The duty to press only valid claims] ... does not end when the pleadings are 
filed. Rather. the plaintiff is impressed with a continuing responsibility to 
review and reevaluate his pleadings and where appropriate modify them to 
conform to Rule 11. In other words, the Rule imposes on litigants a 
continuing duty of candor, and a litigant may be sanctioned for continuing 
to insist upon a position that is no longer tenable. [citations omitted] 
Shirvell v. Gordon, 602 Fed. Appx. 601, 604-605 (6th Cir. Mich. 2015). 
In Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1988), this 
court stated that the reasonable inquiry under Rule 11 is not a one-time 
obligation. The plaintiff is impressed with a continuing responsibility to 
review and reevaluate his pleadings and where appropriate modify them to 
conform to Rule 11. 
Heartwood's argument is significantly weakened by the fact that virtually all of its 
cited cases and treatises were decided prior to the 1993 amendment to Federal Rule 11. 
The compiler's note to Utah Rule 11 states that the Utah rule is substantially similar to its 
federal counterpart. The committee comment to the 1993 amendment to the federal rule, 
which presumptively applies to the Utah rule, provides: "It also, however, emphasizes the 
duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a 
position after it is no longer tenable and by generally providing protection against 
sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called 
to their attention." [Emphasis added] Heartwood's pre-1993 cases are irrelevant to this 
discussion. 
Rule 11 is invoked " [b ]y presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to 
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the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating) ... " Rule l l(b) Utah R. 
Civ. P. Heartwood's response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was by way of other 
papers which were signed asserting the legal and factual substance of Heartwood's 
position in response to the Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. Motion. Thereafter, Heartwood's 
counsel appeared and argued against summary judgment even though his client had 
testified there were no facts to support its claims. Phonometrics, Inc. v. Economy Inns of 
Am., 349 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003). (advocating an unsupported position is a 
violation of Rule l l(b)). Phonometrics further notes the change in the standard arising 
from the 1993 amendment. Id at 1362. 
Heartwood suggests that the trial court ruled against it on the Rule 11 Motion 
based on the content of its complaint. The record says otherwise. The trial court's 
findings listed at page four of its order on the Rule 11 Motion (R682) show that the trial 
court did not base its decision on the fact that the content of the complainfwas wrong 
when the complaint was filed. Rather, because "Heartwood reaffirmed and later 
advocated based on these allegations in opposing these Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment." Id. See also facts numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
It bears mentioning that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has imposed the 
continuing duty standard on Utah lawyers since at least 1996. See Automobile Assur. Fin. 
Corp. v. Syrett Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2072 (10th Cir. Utah Feb. 7, 1997) 
(sanctioning Utah lawyer Parker Nielson for continuing to press baseless claims); Findlay 
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v. Banks (In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp.), 87 F.3d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir. Utah 
1996) (sanctioning Utah lawyer Delno Finlay for post complaint violations); 
In short, once it was pointed out to Heartwood's counsel that Mr. Vasic testified 
Heartwood had "no facts," his arguing otherwise fell within the "advocating" preclusion 
of Rule 11 (b ). This opened his client, and himself, to a sanctions award. 
The trial court properly granted the Rule 11 Utah R. Civ. P. Motion and awarded 
attorneys' fees. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Heartwood's argument opposing summary judgment is grounded in its position 
that the information it offered is sufficient to get past summary judgment because of 
inferences which may be drawn from it. On summary judgment, Courts are not required 
to draw every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor 
of the nonmoving party. IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ~ 19, 
196 P.3d 588. (The word "genuine" indicates that a district court is not required to draw 
every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Instead, it is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party.) 
1. HEARTWOOD IS BOUND BY ITS RULE 30(b)(6) TESTIMONY 
Not surprisingly, Heartwood's Brief does not deal with the impact of its Rule 
30(b)(6) testimony on its defense of Molyneux and Huber's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. Heartwood had at least three opportunities to avoid the impact of Mr. Vasic's 
multiple answers that it had no evidence to support the allegations of the operative 
paragraphs of its complaint. First, Mr. Vasic should have been prepared. Preparing a Rule 
30(b)(6) witness is not just common sense, it is required. Thomas v. Greek, Inc., 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25311 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2010) (holding a party is required to prepare 
its witnesses for depositions noticed under Rule 30(b)(6).) 
During the deposition, Mr. Vasic was free to break and speak with his counsel if 
he had any questions. Counsel was present during the entire deposition and presumably 
listened to the questions and the answers. At page 56 of the deposition [R336] a break 
was taken during Heartwood's deposition and counsel had the opportunity to speak with 
Mr. Vasic ifhe had any concerns about the nature of the answers. A second break was 
taken at page 97 of the deposition. [R347] Much of the "no facts" testimony occurred 
before the second break. [R322-47] Mr. Vasic was sworn at the beginning of the 
deposition so we have every reason to believe his testimony was truthful. 
After Mr. Vasic finished testifying, Heartwood had the opportunity to read and 
amend the deposition under Rule 30(e). No changes were ever submitted. Had Heartwood 
wished to avail itself of the provisions of Rule 3 0( e) it would have needed to provide an 
explanation for each proposed change. No explanation was submitted which would 
suggest that the testimony was erroneous or incomplete in any fashion. 
2. HEARTWOOD IS SUBJECT TO THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE 
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Utah has recognized the sham affidavit doctrine for at least 35 years. See Webster 
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (1983). In Webster v. Sill the court explained this doctrine. " ... 
when a party takes a clear position in a deposition , that is not modified on cross-
examination , he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the discrepancy." at 
1172. Language in Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v Hardy, 2005 UT App 92; 110 P.3d 168, ~14 
fn 1 shows that "own affidavit" means affidavits submitted on the party's behalf as 
opposed to an affidavit of the party personally. Having taken clear and unequivocal 
positions on the evidence in response to questions asked in Mr. Vasic's deposition 
Heartwood may not later attempt to rebut those positions with other evidence. 
Absent admissible evidence not precluded by the sham affidavit doctrine, 
Heartwood had no evidence to rebut Molyneux and Huber's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Molyneux and Huber's Motion was correctly granted by the trial court. 
3. THE CLAIMS FAIL LEGALLY 
In addition to the evidentiary problems associated with Heartwood's Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition and sham affidavit submissions, its claims against Molyneux and Huber fail to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
4. UTAH'S EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTION LAW APPLIES 
Though the "contracts" are not labeled "non-competition agreement" they seek to 
restrict the employment of Molyneux and Huber nonetheless. In the 2003 opinion in 
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Scenic Aviation, Inc. v Blick 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28009 Judge Cassell described the 
state of Utah law on employment restrictions in denying the employer's attempts to keep 
employees from working for a competing small air carrier. 
Rather than refer to the restrictions as non-competition agreements, Scenic 
Aviation uses the broader term "restrictive employment covenants and applies that 
description to attempts to hamper employees in future employment. id at* 14. Scenic 
Aviation notes that under Utah Supreme Court case law restrictions which are designed to 
limit competition or restrain the right to engage in a common calling are not enforceable. 
id at* 15. 
A restrictive covenant may not be enforced against a former employee unless that 
employees services are "special, unique, and extraordinary." id at18-19 Nothing in the 
work Molyneux and Huber did as a registered nurse or a certified nurse's assistant meets 
that description. Heartwood did not argue as much before the trial court and does not do 
so in it briefing here. Rather, Mr. Vasic testified that the actions of Molyneux and Huber 
were merely part of economic competition and not the result of any ill will. rR302, 3531 
In Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
analyzed the law on restrictive employment agreements. It held that, to be enforceable, 
such agreements must be reasonable as to time and geographic coverage. There is no time 
or geographic limitation on the "contracts." Presumably, it is Heartwood's view that it can 
restrict its former employees from eating lunch together for the rest of their lives. 
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Utah law on restrictive employment contracts trumps all of Heartwood's causes of 
action seeking to keep Molyneux and Huber from working elsewhere and associating 
with their friends who previously worked for Heartwood. 
5. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Heartwood asserts that two documents are contracts which Molyneux and Huber 
breached. The first is the Employee Handbook which clearly states, at page 24, "I 
understand that this Handbook represents only current policies and benefits, and that it 
does not create a contract of employment." [R368, 585] Heartwood, having specifically 
disavowed the handbook as a contract, may not now seek to enforce it as such. 
The second document Heartwood seeks to rely on for its breach of contract claim 
is a Confidentiality Agreement which claims on its face that it is a contract between 
Heartwood's employees and their supervisor. The trial court rejected this contract claim 
noting that the supervisor was not a party to the alleged contract. He construed the 
document according to its terms and against Heartwood to the extent the document was 
unclear. [R585] 
The contracts describe the relief available in the event of a breach. That relief is 
limited to termination or discipline by Heartwood. [R585] Mr. Vasic testified that the 
relief for violating the "contracts" was that which is stated within the contract. [R350-51] 
The only relief in the contracts is termination or discipline.[R368-391] Molyneux and 
Huber are no longer Heartwood's employees and may not be terminated or disciplined by 
21 
Heartwood. 
The "contracts" both seek to restrict aspects of Molyneux and Huber's 
employment and ability to work. While not titled "noncompetition agreement" they are 
subject to the same restrictions Utah courts have put on noncompetition agreements. 
6. HIPAA 
Heartwood spends several pages discussing HIP AA, stating its claims are not 
based on that Act. Appellant's Brief at 51-53. Mr. Vasic was questioned about the 
application ofHIPAA to Heartwood's claims against Molyneux and Huber. At pages 104-
105 of his deposition, he was asked; "One of the recurring themes in your complaint is 
confidential and proprietary information. It is my understanding that the basis for the 
claim that it's confidential and proprietary is that it is covered by HIP AA, is that correct?' 
Mr. Vasic's response was unequivocal, "Yes" [R348-49] 
It is well- settled law that HIP AA does not support a private right of action. 
Espinoza v. Gold Cross Servs., 234 P.3d 156, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 2010); Wilkerson v. 
Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010). Heartwood has no legal basis for its 
claims based on HIP AA. 
7. FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Utah case law is clear that an employee's fiduciary duty ends at the termination of 
employment, absent unique circumstances which are not present here. Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179. Heartwood acknowledges in its Opening 
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Brief that all of the events of which they complain occurred after Molyneux and Huber 
employment was terminated. Appellant's Brief at 10, 20. In Spencer Law Office, LLC v. 
Dept. of Workforce Services, 2013 UT App 138 iJ14-17 this court elaborated on the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty as it applies in this case . 
. . . for although an employee should not compete with the employer for 
whom he still works, the employer's right to demand and receive loyalty 
must be tempered by society's legitimate interest in encouraging 
competition .... an employee may properly plan to go into competition with 
his employer and may take active steps to do so while still employed and 
has no general duty to disclose his plans to his employer and, further, that 
he may secretly join other employees in the endeavor without violating any 
duty to his employer. id at iJl 7. 
A further failing of Heartwood's position is that Mr. Vasic testified in his 
deposition that the duty of loyalty was based upon standards set by HIP AA as was the 
breach of confidentiality claim. [R350, 560] As discussed above, HIP AA may not form 
the basis of a private civil action. 
While they were employed by Heartwood, Molyneux and Huber may have had a 
fiduciary duty to Heartwood. Once their employment ended, their fiduciary duty did as 
well. Heartwood's claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, regardless of the alleged factual support. 
8. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
As with its other alleged causes of action, Heartwood's contractual interference 
claim fails because Mr. Vasic testified there were no facts to support it. As with its breach 
of contract claim and its breach of fiduciary duty claim, the contractual interference claim 
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fails to state a cause upon which relief may be granted. 
Heartwood cites the court to Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982) as the basis for its contractual interference claim. While Leigh Furniture 
was the watershed case of this cause in Utah it has since been modified. Eldridge v. 
Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, 345 P.3d 553. The Supreme Court modified the elements of this 
claim. The improper motive element was removed and only the improper means element 
remains. The testimony in this case was clear, regardless of the allegations against Ms. 
Huber, no one left Heartwood's employ at her urging. Those who did leave, Ms. 
Molyneux and Mr. Neilson, left only after they discovered the added compensation and 
benefits offered by the new employer. Further, the employees who did leave left long 
after Ms. Huber had left Heartwood's employ and thus long after anything Ms. Huber did 
was an improper means. 
C. MOLYNEUX AND HUBER ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON 
APPEAL 
1. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 33(c)(l) Utah R. App. P., Molyneux and Huber move the court 
for an order awarding them their attorneys' fees on appeal and remanding this matter to 
the trial court for the determination of the proper amount of those attorneys' fees. This 
motion is grounded in Utah case law awarding attorneys' fees on appeal where attorneys' 
fees were awarded by the trial court. 
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2. ATTORNEYS' FEES WERE AWARDED BELOW 
Molyneux and Huber were awarded attorneys' fees below [R683-84] and should 
be awarded them on appeal. In K.F.K. v. T W, 2005 UT App 85, P8 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005), the court addressed the award of attorneys' fees where counsel had prevailed on a 
Rule 11 Motion in the trial court which was then taken on appeal by the opponent. The 
court awarded that attorney his attorneys' fees on appeal noting that because he had been 
awarded attorneys' fees by the trial court he would also be awarded his attorneys' fees on 
appeal. See also, Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961P.2d305, 319 (Utah 1998). Molyneux and 
Huber base their claims for attorneys' fees on the law of K.F.K. as applied to Rule 11. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The undersigned can count on one hand the number times he has filed a Rule 11 
Motion in his 3 8+ years of practice. Molyneux and Huber are two working-class women, 
an registered nurse and a home health aide, who left one job to pursue another with better 
pay and benefits. This upset their former employer who sued them based upon guesses 
and supposition This lawsuit has forced Molyneux and Huber to incur tens of thousands 
of dollars in attorneys fees to defend factually and legally deficient claims. After an 
opportunity for discovery, Heartwood testified 22 times under oath that it had no evidence 
to support the claims it had made. 
At least as soon as the 30(b)(6) deposition, Heartwood should have dismissed 
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Molyneux and Huber voluntarily. It did not. Heartwood should have dismissed 
Molyneux and Huber upon receipt of the Rule 11 Motion in the safe-harbor period. It did 
not. Instead, with the factual foundation of 22 assertions that there were "no facts," 
Heartwood continued to pursue those claims. 
Heartwood's appeal should be denied and the matter remanded to the trial court 
with an order that it determine the proper amount of attorneys' fees on appeal. 
Dated this 1,.. 'f ~11 day of September, 201 7. 
Robert H. Wilde 
Attorney for Appellees Molyneux and Huber 
ADDENDUM 
Order on Summary Judgment- [R584] 
Order on Rule 11 Motion [R679] 
Heartwood Employee Handbook [R368] 
Rule 11 Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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MERRILL B. NIELSON, RITA HUBER, 
GLENNA MOLYNEUX, GOOD SHEPHERD 
HOME CARE & HOSPICE, INC., 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No.: 120907379 
Judge: John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly before the Court on the 25rn day of February, 2014 at the hour 
of 8:30 a.m. for consideration of Defendant Huber and Defendant Molyneux's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by Gary Guelker. Defendants Huber and Molyneux were 
represented by Robert H. Wilde. The Court having reviewed the memoranda filed, listened to the 
argument of counsel and having reviewed the affidavits and evidence filed in support and opposition 
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thereof and having good cause appearing therefore the Court provides, pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah 
R. Civ. P., a statement of the grounds upon which the Court has ruled. 
Plaintiff sued Defendant Huber and Defendant Molyneux for, 1) breach of employment 
contract, 2) breach of duty of loyalty, 3) breach of duty of confidentiality, 4) intentional interference 
with contract, and 5) for injunctive relief. At oral argument Plaintiffs counsel advised the Court and 
counsel that Plaintiffs claims had been narrowed and that Defendant Huber was being sued only for 
having solicited Plaintiffs employees who then went to work for Defendant Good Shepherd and 
' 
Defendant Molyneux was being sued only for having solicited Plaintiffs patients who then left 
Plaintiff to work for Defendant Good Shepherd. Each of the actions of which Plaintiff complains is 
alleged to have occurred after the Defendants' employment with Plaintiff ended. 
The bases for the claims were two documents prepared by the Plaintiff, an Employee 
Handbook and a Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure Agreement. The Employee Handbook shows on its 
face, at page 24, that "it does not create a contract of employment" and thus cannot form the basis 
for any contract related claim. Plaintiffs president testified in the Plaintiffs deposition that the relief 
available for violation of the provisions of these documents was contained within the documents. 
Each of these documents shows on its face that violation of the terms could lead to revocation of 
access to Plaintiffs document, discipline, or termination. The documents describe no other relief. 
The Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure Agreement states that there exists a contract between the 
employee and the employee's supervisor but no supervisor has been made a party to this action. The 
Court has construed these documents according to their terms and, failing that, has construed them 
against the Plaintiff who drafted them. or had them drafted. Edwards & Daniels Architects v. 
2 
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Farmers' Properties, 865 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As to Defendant Molyneux, Plaintiff a-sserts that it produced evidence from which the Court 
could infer that she took Plaintiffs patients by soliciting them to go to Good Shepherd in violation 
of a contract, a duty of confidentiality, a duty of loyalty, or by interfering with their contracts with 
Plaintiff. The Court noted that notwithstanding Plaintiffs claim that there were between six and 
eight such patients the Plaintiff failed to depose any of these patients or their family members 
concerning the reasons they moved to Good Shepherd even though the Plaintiff had all the 
information it would have needed to locate and.depose these patients. No testimony from any of 
these patients was offered to oppose the motion for summary judgment. The production of weak 
evidence when strong evidence is available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would 
have been adverse. Clifton v. United States, 4 How. 242, 247. Silence then becomes evidence of the 
most convincing character. Runkle v. Burnham, 153 U.S. 216, 225; Kirby v. Tallmadge, 160 U.S. 
379, 383; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153, 154; Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 
U.S. 103, 111, l.12; Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 52; Local 167 v. United States, 
291 U.S. 293, 298; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (U.S. 1939). 
During the Rule 30(b)(6) Utah R. Civ. P. deposition of the Plaintiff given by Plaintiffs 
president Lee Vasic, the witness was asked, at page 80, lines 5-11, what evidence the Plaintiff had to 
support its allegations in paragraph 21 of the complaint that Defendant Molyneux had solicited 
patients at Good Shepherd's behest. He answered "there are no facts" and was asked "just the 
assumption?" to which he answered "just the assumption ... "Based on Plaintiffs uncorrected 
deposition testimony that the allegations were based on assumption the Cou1t declines to infer or 
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conclude Defendant Molyneux solicited Plaintiffs patients as alleged in the complaint. Even if she 
had done so that solicitation, coming after her employment with Plaintiff was terminated, would not 
have been in violation of any enforceable agreement or principal of law. 
As to Defendant Huber, the Plaintiff alleges that she solicited Plaintiffs employees to work 
for GGod Shepherd in violation of her employment contract with Plaintiff. Again the Court notes that 
the Handbook specifically states that it is not a contract so it may not form the basis for this claim 
and the Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure Agreement limits its coverage to internal discipline or 
termination by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs evidence was that Defendant Huber and some of the 
Plaintiffs employees went to lunch after Defendant Huber began working for Good Shepherd and 
thereafter her friends sought employment with Good Shepherd. Defendant Huber denied soliciting 
employees to come to work for Good Shepherd and Defendants Molyneux and Nielson each testified 
that they did not seek work at Good Shepherd because they were solicited by Huber but because the 
terms and conditions of employment were better there. 
In the Plaintiffs deposition Mr. Vasic was asked about the allegations of paragraph 15 of the 
complaint in which the Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Huber was employed by Good Shepherd to 
solicit Plaintiffs employees. At page 63, lines 5-12, he was asked "The allegation is that Good 
Shepherd hired Ms. Huber, the only reason that Good Shepherd hired her is because she agreed to 
contact Heartwood, so your employees, to persuade them to begin working for Good Shepherd. Do 
you have any facts that support that statement?" to which Mr. Vasic answered "Yeah, l'm--yeah, I'm 
not sure about that statement. I don't have any facts to support that statement." Based on Plaintiffs 
uncorrected deposition testimony that the allegations had no factual support the Court declines to 
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infer or conclude Defendant Huber solicited Plaintiff's employees as alleged in the complaint. Even 
if she had done so that would not have been in violation of any enforceable agreement or principal of 
law. 
In the Plaintiff's deposition Mr. Vasic was asked if the basis for the claims against the 
Defendants was that they were covered by HIPAA, Plaintiff's deposition at 104:22-105:1. Mr. Vasic 
answered affirmatively. All reported cases on the issue indicate that there is no private right of action 
under HIPAA regardless of how the claim is alleged. Bradley v. Pfizer, Inc., 440 Fed. Appx. 805, 
809 (11th Cir. 2011) (invasion of privacy claim not supported by alleged HIP AA violation); Seaton 
v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 2010) (due process violation claim not supported by alleged 
HIPAA violation); Huling v. City of Los Banos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8765 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 
2012) (invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with 
advantageous relationships, and negligence not supported by alleged HIPAA violation). 
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's claims pertain to legal theories for which the underlying 
grounds are violations of HIP AA, they fail as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff seeks to restrict the individual Defendants' ability to be employed and/or to interact 
with others. Restrictive covenants are not favored in the law but are allowed if they are narrowly 
tailored to accomplish legitimate ends. Restricting competition is not a legitimate end. The 
restrictions Plaintiff seeks to enforce on the individual Defendants have no geographic or temporal 
bounds and are therefore grossly over broad. Because covenants which are primarily designed to 
limit competition or restrain the right to engage in a common calling are not enforceable, neither the 
"contracts" nor claims based on them may not be enforced against these Defendants. digEcor, Inc. v. 
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e.Digital Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28199, 4-5 (D. Utah Apr. 2, 2009); Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. 
Blick, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28009 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2003). 
Plaintiff has not offered admissible evidence in response to Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment but has instead relied upon speculation, conjecture, inadmissible hearsay and statements 
without foundation. See Plaintiffs facts numbered 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and Plaintiffs exhibits 
G, H, I, J, L, M, N, and 0. Plaintiff further attempts to recast the answers given by Mr. Vasic in the 
deposition to infer that he 'testified that he had no direct evidence or first hand knowledge of the 
information sought in the deposition. Mr. Vasic in fact did not use the terms direct evidence or first 
hand knowledge in responding to most of the questions at issue though he was required by Rule 
30(b)(6) to become familiar with the Plaintiffs case and facts prior to being deposed. The Court 
rejects Plaintiffs attempt to restate its deposition answers. 
Once a motion for summary judgment is filed with proper support it becomes the opposing 
party's duty to respond with evidence, which would be admissible at trial, on each element of the 
challenged causes of action. The Court concludes that while the Plaintiff may have produced 
evidence on some of the elements of its claims it did not produce evidence establishing all of the 
elements of any of its claims and has accordingly not met its burden on summary judgment. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment 
filed by Defendants Huber and Molyneux is granted and Plaintiffs claims against them are 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
END OF ORDER 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to be served by the 
method(s) indicated below and addressed to the following on February 28, 2014. 
Gary Guelker 
Janet Jenson 
747 East South Temple #130 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David N. Kelly 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State St. # 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Merrill Nielson (U.S. Mail) 
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West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
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()Facsimile 
()E-mail 
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Isl Robert H Wilde 
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MERRILL B. NIELSON, an individual, RITA 
HUBER, an individual, GLENNA 
MOb YNEUX; an individual, and GOOD 
SHEPHERD HOME CARE & HOSPICE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 120907379 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
· THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Glenna Molyneux and Rita Huber's 
(these Defendants) motion for sanctions. The parties briefed the issues and the Court heard 
argument on April 21, 2014. The Court then allowed supplemental briefing and the matter was 
submitted on Ap~l 23, 2014. Having carefully reviewed the record and considering the 
arguments of co~sel, the Court now issues the following Order. 
By way of background, Plaintiff Heartwood Home Health & Hospice, LLC (Heartwood) 
initiated the instant action in November 2012, alleging various causes of action against these 
Defendants relating to their conduct around the time they ended their employment with 
Heartwood. Heartwood's Complaint contains the following factual allegations: 
0679 
31. The individual defendants breached their confidentiality and non-disclosure 
agreements with Heartwood by copying, removing and using Heartwood's 
proprietary information and by contacting Heartwood's patients and current 
employees in [an improper manner]. 
34. The individual defendants violated their duties of loyalty owed to Heartwood 
in that, while still employed by Heartwood, defendants competed against 
Heartwood, defamed and disparaged Heartwood's business and employees, 
misappropr;iated confidential and proprietary information, improperly disclosed 
such information to third parties, including Good Shepherd, and solicited 
Heartwood's employees and customer contacts for Good Shepherd's business. 
38. On information arid belief, the individual defendants breached their duty of 
confidentiality by disclosing Heartwood's confidential information to third 
parties, inCluding Good Shepherd, and by using and disclosing such confidential 
information for their own benefit, including to compete unfairly against 
Heartwood. 
42. Heaft\Vood has been hahned by the defendants Huber, Nielson and 
Molyneaux who have, for their own benefit, and for the benefit of Good 
Shepherd, intentionally and willfully interfered with the contracts that Heartwood 
has with it~ patients. Defendants Huber, Nielson and Molyneaux have knowingly 
and intentionally misinfonried Heartwood's patients concerning the terms of their 
contracts to induce them to terminate their contracts with Heartwood. They have 
interfered with and induced Heartwood's patients to terminate their agreements 
with Heartwood on behalf of and for the benefit of Good Shepherd. 
(ComplaintiJiJ 31, 34, 38, 42.) 
After conducting discovery, including the deposition of Heartwood's owner, Lee Vasic, it 
became clear to these Defendants that Heartwood did not have any evidence to support its claims 
against them. Accordingly, these Defendants served Heartwood with their Rule 11 motion under 




Defendants moved for summary judgment. Heartwood contested the motion for summary 
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judgment but, at oral argument, informed the Court and opposing counsel that its claims against 
these Defendants had been narrowed. Heartwood explained that it was only pursuing claims 
against Huber for soliciting Heartwood's employees and against Molyneux for soliciting 
Heartwood's patients. The Court ultimately ruled in favor of these Defendants on summary 
judgment and dismissed all claims against them. These Defendants then filed their motion for 
sanctions with the Court. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a party's "allegations and 
other factual contentions have evidenfiary support or, if specifically se-identified~~"are likely to 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]" 
Utah R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3). If an attorney or party violates Rule 1 l(b)(3), then the court may 
"impose an appropriate sanction." Utah R. Civ. P. ll(c). "The law requires that a trial court 
make a series of specific factual findings as a predicate for concluding that the rule has been 
violated, and then must determine the appropriate sanction." Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, if 
10, 985 P.2d 255. 
Rule 11 does not call for the imposition of sanctions whenever there are factual 
errors; the misstatements must be significant and sanctions will not be imposed 
when they are not critical and the surrounding circumstances indicate that counsel 
did conduc~ a reasonable inquiry .... [T]he fact that a complaint is dismissed for 
·legal insuf:j:iciency or does not produce a triable issue does not necessarily mean 
that a sanction is appropriate. 
Morse v. Packer, ?OOO UT 86, , 28, 15 P .3d 1021 (quoting SA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1335, at 67, 88 (1990)). 
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These Defendants contend that Heartwood's allegations against them lacked evidentiary 
support. They argue that the lack of evidentiary support should have been obvious after Mr. 
V asic' s deposition and that, by failing to withdraw its claims, Heartwood violated Rule 11. The 
Court agrees and makes the following specific factual findings in support of its conclusion: 
1. Heartwood made allegations against these Defendants in its Complaint for, among 
other things, improper conduct in soliciting Heartwood's employees and patients. 
2. Heartwood reaffirmed and later advocated based on these allegations in opposing 
these Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
3. Heartwood lacked evidentiary support and legal basis for its allegations against these 
Defendants. 
4. Although Heartwood may have had reason to believe at the time it filed its Complaint 
that the allegations against these Defendants would materialize, Heartwood was 
unable, after conducting discovery, to produce any evidence in support of the 
allegations. 
5. Mr. Vasic made clear in his deposition that Heartwood had no evidence to support its 
claims against these Defen~ants. 
6. At the end of discovery, it should have been clear to Heartwood that it was unable to 
support its claims against these Defendants with evidence. 
7. It was unreasonable for Heartwood to continue prosecuting its claims against these 
Defendants after it became clear that the claims lacked evidentiary support or legal 
basis. 
8. Heartwood relied on speculation and assumptions in continuing to prosecute its 
claims against these Defendants and in opposing these Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
9. By refusing to withdraw its claims against these Defendants after Mr. Vasic's 
deposition, Heartwood acted in bad faith. 
Based on the foregoing factual findings, the Court concludes that Heartwood violated 
. . 
Rule 11 by failing to withdraw its claims against these Defendants after being served under the 
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safe harbor provision and by continuing to advocate for a position that clearly lacked evidentiary 
support. In so concluding, the Court rejects Heartwood's argument that the only relevant inquiry 
under a Rule 11 analysis is on the reasonableness of counsel's investigation at the beginning of 
the case. As the Utah Supreme Court stated, "a litigant's obligations with respect to the contents 
of these papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the 
court, but include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings 
and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit." Morse, 2000 UT 86, ii 31 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ,advisory committee note). 
Having concluded that HeartWood violated Rule 11,. the Court next determines the 
appropriate sanction. The Court has discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the 
facts this case. See Bailey-Al/en Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 195 (noting that the trial court 
is given "great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the particular case"). 
Because Heartwood's conduct caused these Defendants to incur extra fees in continuing to 
defend· against baseless claims, the Court determines that these Defendants are entitled to 
compensation for their reasonable attorney fees incurred litigating their motion for summary 
judgment and motion for sanctions. 
Based on .·the foregoing, these Defendants' motion for sanctions is GRANTED. 
Heartwood shall pay these Defendants for their reasonable attorney fees in defending the claims 
after it became clear that the claims lacked evidentiary support and legal basis. These Defendants 
shall submit an attorney fee affidavit within 10 days and Heartwood may file an objection as 
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permitted by the rules. The Court will then determine the amount of sanction. No additional 
order is necessary. 
DATED this ,b day of June, 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Welcome 
Welcome to Heartwood Home Health & Hospice! 
Dear Employee: 
You and Heartwood Home Health & Hospice have made an important decision: The Company 
has decided you can contribute to our success, and you've decided that Heartwood Home Health 
& Hospice is the organization where you can pursue your career productively and enjoyably. 
We believe we've each made the right decision, one that will result in a profitable relationship. 
The minute you start working here, you become an integral part of Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice and its future. Every job in our company is important, and you will play a key role in 
the continued growth of our company. · 
As you will quickly discover, our success is based on delivering high quality service and 
providing unsurpassed patient care. How do we do-it? By working very hard, thinking about our 
patients' needs, and doing whatever it takes. We do it by treating each other and customers with 
respect. We do it by acting as a team. 
Should you have any questions concerning this handbook, your employment or benefits, please 
feel free to discuss them with your supervisor or manager. 
Again, welcome! 
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Introduction & Description of Company 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice is dedicated to providing the best care 
possible to our patients and theirfam.ilies. 
Confidentiality Agreement 
In order for HEARTWOOD HOME HEAL TH & HOSPICE to be successful in providing top 
quality care to people, we must have the confidence and trust of the people that we work with. 
Confidentiality is essential if we are to be worthy of this trust. Empioyment may involve access 
to data that is confidential according to both Federal and State Law. 
Under Section 1166 of Title I of the Social Security Act, any data or information acquired by this 
agency in the exercise of its function must be held in confidenc~-~d .may not be disclosed to any 
person except (a) to the extent that it may be necessary to carry out the agency's responsibility, 
or (b) in such cases and under such circumstances as the Secretary of the Department of Health 
Educational and Welfare may, by regulation, provide to assure adequate protection of the rights 
and interests of patients, health care practitioners, and providers of health care services. 
Violations of disclosure prohibitions are subject to penalty, upon conviction, of a fine more than 
$1,000 and imprisonment for six ( 6) months or both. 
Each employee of HEARTWOOD HOME HEALTII & HOSPICE shall not disclose any 
information regarding current or former employees to patients or outside the organization except 
as authorized by our policies. Your employment contract is between you and your supervisor, 
and aspects of your schedule or pay should not be shared with others. No staff shall disclose any 
inappropriate personal situations. Any use of Heartwood marketing materials, advertisements, 
and policies may not be used in future business ventures or employment. Confidential 
information shall not be disclosed to any employee, consultant, patient, family, or other third 
party unless specifically authorized by the director. 
Knowledge of employees and patients is specifically the privilege of your employment here. If 
your employment should end with HEARTWOOD HOME HEAL TH & HOSPICE, you are 
prohibited to , contact any employee, patient, or other professional relationship you have that was 
a result of being an employee of HEARTWOOD HOME HEAL TH & HOSPICE. Caring for 
current or past Heartwood Home Health and Hospice patients on a private duty basis outside of 
your employment with HEARTWOOD HOME HEALTH & HOSPICE is strictly prohibited and 
will be grounds for immediate termination. 
Conflict of Interest 
Employees must avoid any interest, influence or relationship which might conflict or appear to 
conflict with the best interests of Heartwood Horne Health & Hospice. You must avoid any 
Last Updated 12/16/2011 12:41 PM 037d 
l_ ..... 
situation in which your loyalty may be divided and promptly disclose any situation where an 
actual or potential conflict may exist. 
Examples of potential conflict situations include: 
1 Having a financial interest in any business transaction with Heartwood Horne Health & 
Hospice 
2 Owning or having a significant financial interest in, or other relationship with, a 
Heartwood Horne Health & Hospice competitor, customer or supplier, and 
3 Accepting gifts, entertainment or other benefit of more than a nominal value from a 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice competitor, customer or supplier. 
4 Working privately for any of Heartwood's past or current patients. 
Anyone with a conflict of interest must disclose it to management and remove themselves from 
negotiations, deliberations or votes involving the coriflict. You may, however, state your position 
and answer questions when your lmowledge may be of assistance to Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice. 
Anti Discrimination & Harassment 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
It is Heartwood Home Health & Hospice's policy that we will not discriminate against qualified 
individuals with disabilities with regard to any aspect of their employment. Heartwood Home 
Health & Hospice is committed to complying with the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 
and its related Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice recognizes that some individuals with disabilities may require accommodations at work. 
If you are currently disabled or become disabled during your employment, you should contact 
your manager to discuss reasonable accommodations that may enable you to perfonn the 
essential functions of your job. Documentation of your disability must be given in writing to 
your direct supervisor and Human Resources so that arrangements can be made to your work 
processes to effectively accommodate your disability. 
Equal Opportunity Policy 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice provides equal opportunity in all of our employment 
practices to all qualified employees and applicants without regard to race, color, religion, gender, 
national origin, age, disability, marital status, military status or any other category protected by 
federal, state and local laws. This policy applies to all aspects of the employment relationship, 
including recruitment, hiring, compensation, promotion, transfer, disciplinary action, layoff, 
return frorri layoff, training and social, and recreational programs. All such employment 
decisions will be made without unlawfully discriminating on any prohiblted basis. 
Policy Prohibiting Harassment and Discrimination 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice strives to maintain an environment free from discrimination · 
and harassment, where employees treat each other with respect, dignity and courtesy. 
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This policy applies to all phases of employment, including but not limited to recruiting, testing, 
hiring, promoting, demoting, transferring, laying off, tenninating, paying, granting benefits and 
training. 
Prohibited Behavior 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice does not and will not tolerate any type of harassment of our 
employees, applicants for employment, or our customers. Discriminatory conduct or conduct 
characterized as harassment as defined below is prohibited. 
The tenn harassment includes, but is not limited to, slurs, jokes, and other verbal or physical 
conduct relating to a person's gender, ethnicity, race, color, creed, religion, sexual orientation, 
national origin, age, disability, marital status, military sta~s or any other protected classification 
that unreasonably interferes with a person's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile 
work environment. 
Sexually harassing behavior in particular includes unwelcome conduct such as: sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, offensive touching, or .other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature. Such conduct may constitute sexual harassment when it: 
1 is made an explicit or implicit condition of employment 
2 is used as the basis for employment decisions 
3 unreasonably interferes with an individual's work performance, or 
4 creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 
The types of conduct covered by this policy include: demands or subtle pressure for sexual 
favors accompanied by a promise of favorable job treatment or a threat concerning employment. 
Specifically, it includes sexual behavior such as: 
1 repeated sexual flirtations, advances or propositions 
2 continued and repeated verbal abuse of a sexual nature, 
3 sexually related comments and joking, graphic or 
4 degrading comments about an employee's appearance 
5 or displaying sexually suggestive objects or pictures 
6 including cartoons and vulgar email messages, and 
7 any uninvited physical contact or touching, such as patting, pinching or repeated brushing 
against another's body. 
Such conduct may constitute sexual harassment regardless of whether the conduct is between 
members of management, between management and staff employees, between staff employees, 
or directed at employees by nonemployees conducting business with the Company, regardless of 
gender or sexual orientation. 
Harassment by Nonemployees 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice will also protect its employees from reported harassment by 
nonemployees in the workplace, including customers, patients and suppliers. 
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Complaint Procedure and Investigation 
Any employee who wishes to report a possible incident of sexual harassment or other unlawful 
harassment or discrimination should promptly report the matter to Lee Vasic. If that person is not 
available, or you believe it would be inappropriate to contact that person, contact Jessica Roclme 
or Lee Vasic. 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice will conduct a prompt investigation as confidentially as 
possible under the circumstances. Employees who raise concerns and make reports in good faith 
can do so without fear of reprisal; at the same time employees have an obligation to cooperate 
Heartwood Horne Health & Hospice in enforcing this policy and investigating and remedying 
complaints. 
Any employee who becomes.aware of possible sexual harassment or other illegal discrimination 
against others should promptly advise Lee Vasic or any other appropriate member of 
management. 
Anyone found to have engaged in such wrongful behavior will be subject to appropriate 
discipline, which may include termination. 
Retaliation 
Any employee who files a complaint of sexual harassment or other discrimination in good faith 
will not be adversely affected in terms and conditions of employment and will not be retaliated 
against or discharged because of the complaint. 
In addition, we will not tolerate retaliation against any employee who, in good faith, cooperates 
in the investigation of a complaint. Anyone who engages in such retaliatory behavior will be 
subject to appropriate discipline, up to and including tennination. 
Employment at Will 
Unless expressly proscribed by statute or contract, your employment is "at will. 11 All Heartwood 
Home Health & Hospice employees are at will, which means they may be tenninated at any time 
and for any reason, with or without advance notice. Employees are also free to quit at any time. 
Any employment relationship other than at will must be set out in writing and signed by 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice's Administrator, Lee Vasic. 
Compensation & Work Schedule 
Attendance & Punctuality 
Every employee is expected to attend work regularly and report to work on time. Hours of 
operation are Monday through Friday 9run-5pm. 
If you are unable to report to work on time for any reason, telephone tl1e office at 801-261-9490 
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and the report line at 801-639-5030 as far in advance ~possible. If you do not call in an absence 
in advance, it will be considered unexcused. 
Unsatisfactory attendance, including reporting late, quitting early, rescheduling too many 
patients, etc. may be cause for disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. 
If you require an alternate work schedule to accommodate family and school obligations, please 
coordinate these in writing with your supervisor. Examples would be arriving after 9arn or 
leaving before 5pm or any regularly scheduled appointment you may have. 
Genera) Pay Information 
Certain deductions will be made in accordance with federal and state laws. 
In addition, the Company makes available certain voluntary deductions as part of the Company's 
benefits program. If an employee elects supplemental coverage under one of the Company's 
benefits plans, which requires employee contributions, the employee's share of the cost will be 
deducted from his or her check each pay period.Jfthe employee is not receiving a payroll check 
due to illness, injury, or leave of absence, he or she wil1 be required to pay the monthly cost 
directly to the Company. 
Outside Employment 
Because of Heartwood Home Health & Hospice's obligations to its customers, the Company 
must be aware of any concurrent employment you may have to determine whether or not it 
presents a potential conflict 
Serving on any public or government board or commission qualifies as employment for purposes 
of this policy, regardless of whether such service is compensated. 
Before beginning or continuing outside employment, employees are required to complete a 
questionnaire detailing the involvement with the other employer and to obtain the written 
approval of their managers and Staffing. Failing to obtain prior approval as described may be 
cause for disciplinary action, up to and including temrination. Employees who are on leave of 
absence, including FMLA leave or Workers' Compensation leave are prohibited from having 
outside employment during their leave. 
Pay Schedule 
Employees will be paid on Friday, every two weeks. If the regular payday falls on a holiday, 
payday will be the last regular workday before the holiday. 
The pay week starts at the beginning of your shift on Sunday and includes all work you perform 
up to the close of business on Friday. 
If a paycheck is lost or stolen, notify Jessica Rockne immediately. 




Supervisors and employees are strongly encouraged to discuss job performance and goals 
infonnally any time. 
Additional formal performance reviews will be conducted to provide both supervisors and 
employees with the opportunity to discuss job tasks, identify and correct weaknesses, encourage 
and recognize strengths, and discuss positive, purposeful approaches for meeting goals. These 
formal reviews will be conducted annually. 
Time Records 
All employees must keep accurate time/visit records by completing timesheets when entering or 
leaving the office or a patient's home. Tampering with, falsifying or altering time records or 
completing another-employee'.flime card will resuJt in disciplinary action, up to and including 
cliscbarge. Failing to record work time may also result in clisciplinary action. 
For payroll purposes, time is rounded to the nearest quarter of an hour. If timesheets or visit 
notes are nq~ wrrie9 m daily, the employee will not be paid timely. 
Work Hours 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice follows a work schedule of 40 hours per week. The normal 
workweek and standard office hours are Monday through Friday from 9am to 5pm. Your 
supervisor or manager may establish alternative hours or visits. 
Overtime Hours 
Overtime should only be used in instances when deemed necessary by management. Heartwood 
will pay employees overtime based on Utah and Federal government guidelines. However, 
every effort should be made to not work overtime. 
Compensation Time 
Compensation time, meaning time worked but not paid for until a later date is not acceptable 
except within the week that it is worked. For example, if you work 10 hours on Monday, you 
may talce the extra two hours off during the current workweek., but you cannot save the two hours 
to be paid as time off at another date. 
Conduct Standards 
Company Equipment and Vehicles 
When using Heartwood Home Health & Hospice property, including computer equipment or 
hardware, exercise care, perform required maintenance and follow all operating instructions, 
safety standards and guidelines. 
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Notify your supervisor if any equipment or machines appear to be damaged, defective or in need 
of repair. This prompt reporting could prevent the equipment's deterioration and could also help 
prevent injury to you or others. Should you have questions about the maintenance and care of 
any workplace equipment, ask your supervisor. 
If you use or operate equipment improperly, carelessly, negligently or unsafely, you may be 
disciplined or even discharged. In addition, you may be held financially responsible for any loss 
to Heartwood Home Health & Hospice because of such mistreatment. 
Company Property 
Please keep your work area neat and clean and use normal care in handling company property. 
Report any broken or damaged equipment to your manager at once so that proper repairs can be 
made. 
You may not use any company property for personal purposes or remove any company property 
from the premises without prior written permission from Lee Vasic. 
Conduct Standards & Discipline 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice expects every employee to adl1ere to the highest standards 
of job performance and of personal conduct, including individual involvement with company 
personnel and outside business contacts. 
The Company reserves the right to discipline or discharge any employee for violating any 
company policy, practice or rule of conduct. The following list is intended to give you notice of 
our expectations and standards. However, it does not include every type of unacceptable 
behavior that can or will result in disciplinary action. Be aware that Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice retains the discretion to detennine the nature and e~ent of any discipline based upon the 
circumstances of each individual case. 
Employees may be disciplined or terminated for poor job performance, including, but not limited 
to the following: 
• unsatisfactory quality or quantity of work 
• repeated unexcused absences or lateness 
• failing to follow instructions or Company procedures, or 
• failing to follow established safety regulations. 
• Putting patient's care in jeopardy 
• violating HIP AA 
• falsifying timesheet information 
• discussing your personal infonnation with other staff mem hers 
Employees may also be disciplined or terminated for misconduct, including, but not limited to 
the following: 
• falsifying an employment application or any other company records or documents 
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• failing to record working time accurately or recording a co-worker's timesheet 
• insubordination or other refusal to perfonn 
• using vulgar, profane or obscene language, including any communication or action that 
violates our policy against harassment and other unlawful forms of discrimination 
• disorderly conduct, _fighting or other acts of violence 
• misusing, destroying or stealing company property or another person's property 
• possessing, entering with or using weapons on company property 
• possessing, selling, using or reporting to work with alcohol, controlled substances or 
illegal drugs present in the employee's system, on company property or on company time 
• violating conflict of interest rules 
• disclosing or using confidential or proprietary infonnatic~n without authorization 
• violating the Company's computer or software use policies, and 
• being. convicted of a crime that indicates unfitness for a job or presents a threat to the 
Company or its employees in any way. 
Dress Policy 
.t.\p.propriate_a.ffice attire is required. Suppliers and customers visit our office an.d-WewisJl:;.to:put 
forth an image that will make us all proud to be Heartwood Horne Health & Hospice employees. 
Be guided by common sense and good taste. 
Office staff is required to wear 'business casual' every day. Field staffis required to wear wrute 
scrubs and maintain cleanliness of self and uniforms. 
Drug and Alcohol Policy 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice strives to maintain a workplace free of drugs and alcohol 
and to discourage drug and alcohol abuse by its employees. Misuse of alcohol or drugs by 
employees can impair the ability of employees to perform their duties, as well as adversely affect 
our customers' and customers' confidence in our company. 
Alcohol 
Employees are prohibited from using or being under the influence of alcohol while performing 
company business for Heartwood Home Health & Hospice, while operating a motor vehicle in 
the course of business or for any job-related purpose, or while on company premises or a 
worksite. 
Illegal Drugs 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice employees are prohibited from using or being under the 
influence of illegal drugs while performing company business or while on a company facility or 
worksite. You may not use, manufacture, distribute, purchase, transfer or possess an illegal drug 
while in Heartwood Home Health & Hospice facilities, while operating a motor vehicle for any 
job-related pUIJ>ose or while on the job, or whlle performing company business. This policy 
does not prohibit the proper use of medication under the direction of a physician; however, 
misuse of such medications is prohibited. 
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... fa::'ry Action 
· . :J ·· who violate this policy may be disciplined or temtlnated, even for a first offense. 
, , .. or,;) mclude refusal to consent to and comply with testing and search procedures as 
·· r :u.'S 
• •. : •J Home Health & Hospice may conduct searches for iJlegaJ drugs or alcohol on 
, . i\ cilities or worksites without prior notice to employees. Such searches may be 
, • • •.t1 tt any time. Employees are expected to cooperate fully. 
· :. i employees and their personal property may be conducted when there is reasonable 
' . • tu believe that the employee has violated this policy or when circumstances or 
:on.ditions justify such a search. Personal property may include, but is not limited to, 
· .~.:s., briefcases, as well as any Heartwood Home HeaJth & Hospice property that is 
·'J :.· employees' personal use, such as desks, lockers, and files. 
• •' ·r>:r.' r. r.onsent to a search is required as a condition of employment and the employee's 
.!· ;3ent may result in disciplinary action, including termination. 
U', 
.. '-lome HeaJth & Hospice may require a blood test, urinalysis, hair test or other drug 
".~ eening of employees suspected of using or being under the influence of drugs or 
·1.1::.:n; other circumstances or workplace conditions justify such testing. The refusal to 
• 'r testing may result in disciplinary action, including termination. 
· '..t ntl Legal Business Practices 
·., · " \ lo·ne Health & Hospice expects the highest standard of ethical conduct and fair 
. c.;u each employee, officer, director, volunteer and all others associated with the 
. Our reputation is a valuable asset, and we must continually earn the trust, confidence 
, 1.:r,t c.if our suppliers, our members, our customers and our community. 
: • t r · ilicy provides general guidance on the ethical principles that we all must follow, but no 
1 · , c: c:.mi anticipate all situations. You should also be guided by basic honesty and good 
·, . , .• r.n1, and be sensitive to others' perceptions and interpretations. 
. •. 11: ' C any questions about this policy, consult your supervisor or manager. Exceptions to 
1· . · ,1-y may be made only by Lee Vasic. 
,., :u~: expected to promptly disclose to the management of the company anything that may 
.. ; ' il , il.11.'; policy. We will not tolerate retaliation or retribution against anyone who brings 
: : l~t :tm•; to management's attention. 
: '1. nplying With Laws and Regulations 
I .~u. ,:ctivities are to be conducted in compliance with the letter and spirit of all Jaws aJld 
:. ·l.1!.ow;. You are charged with the responsibility of understanding the applicable laws, 
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recognizing potential dangers and knowing when to seek Jega1 advice. 
Giving and Receiving Gifts 
You may not give or receive money or any gift to or from a patient, family member or other 
organization or person. Exceptions may be made for gifts that are customary and lawful, are of 
nominal value end are authorized in advance. 
You may accept meals and refreshments if they are infrequent, are of nominal value end are in 
connection with business discussions. 
If you do receive a gift or other benefit of more than nominal value, report it promptly to a 
member of management. It will be returned or donated to a suitable charity. 
Employee Privncy and Other Confidential Information 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice coUeds only personal infonnation about employees that 
relates to their employment. Only people with a business-related need to know are given access 
to this information, and Lee Vasic must authorize any release of the info.r:matirui_taother:s. 
Personal information, other than that required to verify employment or to satisfy legitimate 
investigatory or legal requirements, will be released outside the company only with employee 
approval . 
If you have access to any confidential information, including private employee information, you 
are responsible for acting with integrity. Unauthorized disclosure or inappropriate use of 
confidential information will not be tolerated. 
Accounting and Financial Reports 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice's financial statements and all books and records on which 
they are based must accurately reflect the Company's transactions. All disbursements and 
receipts must be properly authorized and recorded. 
You must record and report financial information accurately. Reimbursable business expenses 
must be reasonable, accurately reported and supported by receipts. 
Those responsible for handling or disbursing funds must assure that all transactions are executed 
as authorized and recorded to pennit financial statements in accord with GeneraJly Accepted 
Accounting Principles. 
Account and Patient Information 
Employees are prohibited from distributing account, client, and/or customer information to 
anyone, in any form, except the named account holder, cHent or customer. 
Compliance 
Employees who fail to comply with this policy will be disciplined, which may include a demand 
for reimbursement of any losses or damages, termination of employment and referral for criminal 
prosecution. Action appropriate to the circumstances will also be taken against supervisors or 
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others who fail to report a violation or withhold relevant information concerning a violation of 
this policy. 
Grievances 
Employees are encouraged to bring concerns, problems and grievances to management's 
attention. You are also obligated to report any wrongdoing of which you become aware to your 
manager or, if the situation warrants, to any Heartwood Home Health & Hospice officer. 
Progressive Discipline 
Heartwood Horne Health & Hospice retains the discretion to discipline its employees. Oral and 
written warnings and progressive discipline up to and including discharge may be administered 
as appropriate under the circumstances. 
Please note that Heartwood Home Health & Hospice reserves the right to terminate any 
employee whose conduct merits inunediate dismissal without resorting to any aspect of the 
progressive diseipline process. 
Zero Tolerance for Workplace Violence 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice has a zero-tolerance policy concerning threats, intimidation 
and violence of any kind in the workplace either committed by or directed to our employees. 
Employees who engage in such conduct will be disciplined, up to and including immediate 
termination of empJoyment. 
Employees are not permitted to bring weapons of any kind onto company premises or to 
company functions. Any employee who is suspected of possessing a weapon will be subject to a 
search at the company's discretion. Such searches may include, but not be limited to, the 
employee's personal effects, desk and workspace. 
If an employee feels he or she has been subjected to threats or threatening conduct by a 
coworker, patient or customer, the employee should notify his or her supervisor or another 
member of management immediately. Employees will not be penalized for reporting such 
concerns. 
FarniJy Medical Leave (FMLA) 
General 
Family and Medical Leave 
Leave 
You are eligible for family and medical leave if you have worked for Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice for at least 12 months and have put in at least 1,250 hours during the 12 month period 
before the leave is to begin. 
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Reasons for the Leave 
You are entitled to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave: 
• to attend to the birth, adoption or foster care placement of your child 
• to attend to the serious health condition of your child, spouse or parent, or 
• to receive care for your own serious health condition. 
A serious health condition means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition 
during which you are incapable of working that involves either: 
• treatment requiring inpatient care in a hospital, hospice or residential care facility, or 
• continuing treatment by a health care provider for a condition that lasts more than three 
consecutive days, or for pregnancy or prenatal care or for a chrqrric heal:th condition 
which continues over an extended period of time, requires periodic visits to a health care 
provider and may involve occasional episodes ofincapacity, such as serious asthma or 
diabetes. 
It also includes a permanent or long-term condition such as AJ.z11eimer's;'-n severe stroke and 
terminal cancer. In addition, leave may be used to cover absences due to multiple treatments for 
restorative surgery or for a condition which would likely make you incapable of working for 
more than three days if not treated, such as chemotherapy or radiation treatments for cancer. 
Substituting Paid Leave 
You must substitute accrued vacation or personal )eave time for family and medical leave. And if 
the request for leave is due to your own serious health condition, you must first exhaust all 
accrued PTO. Your total FMLA leave time, which may include paid vacation and sick time, may 
not exceed 12 weeks. The Company has the right to designate such leaves as running 
concurrently with FMLA leave. 
Types of Leave 
Leave due to the birth or placement of a child in your home for adoption or foster care must be 
taken in one continuous 12-week segment and must be taken within 12 months of the birth or 
placement of the child. You may take leave due to your own or a family member's serious health 
condition in: 
• one continuous 12 week segment 
• a.ii intermittent schedule, such as one day off each week, or 
• a reduced schedule, such as beginning two hours late, twice a week. 
Notice of Leave 
If your need for leave is foreseeable, you must give 30 days prior notice if possible. If you do 
not give such notice, the leave may be delayed for up to 30 days. · 
If your need for leave is due to a planned medical treatment, make every attempt to schedule the 
treatment so as not to unduly disrupt the work of your department. If your need for leave is not 
foreseeable, you must request it as soon as practicable, no later than two business days after the 
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need for leave arises. 
Medical Certification 
If leave is requested due to your own or a family member's serious health condition, you must 
provide medical certification from an appropriate health care provider. The medical certification 
must include the date on which the condition began and its probable duration. You may be 
denied leave if you do not provide satisfactory certification. Heartwood Home Health & Hospice 
may also require a second opinion or third opinion regarding certification of a serious health 
condition, at our expense. 
Outside Employment 
You may not work for outside employers while on family and medical leave with Heartwood 
Home Health & Hospice. 
Returning to Work 
If your leave is due to your own medical condition, you are required to provide medical 
certification that you are able to resume work before returning. Both you and your health care 
provider must complete a Return to Work Medical Certification. ·· . 
Upon returning to work, you will ordinarily be entitled to be restored to your former position or 
to an equivalent position with the same employment benefits and pay if possible. If you do not 
return to work at the end of the leave and do not notify Heartwood Home Health & Hospice of 
your status, you may be tenninated. This must be done for any illness resulting in a loss of two 
or more consecutive days. 
Benefits During Leave 
Taking family and medical leave will not cause you to lose any employment benefits accrued 
prior to the first day of leave. The leave period will be treated as continued service for purposes 
of determining vesting and eligibility to participate in any retirement plan in effect. However, 
employees on FMLA leave nonnally will not accrue any other additional benefits during the 
leave period, unless it is paid leave under which benefits would otherwise accrue. 
Misrepresenting Reasons for Leave 




Employees at Heartwood Home Health & Hospice are either full-time or part-time. The 
Company may on occasion hire temporary or seasonal employees, who will not generally be 
eligible for benefits. 
Part-time employees work fewer than 35 hours/visits per week, but more than 15 hours/visits per 
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week. Unless specifically stated, employees working less than 15 hours are not afforded any 
benefits other than wages; for example, they do not accrue benefits such as sick days, vacation 
days, and health insurance. 
All other employees are full-time. 
Your supervisor will verify whether you are a full-time or part-time employee, and also whether 
you are exempt or non-exempt. Exempt employees are not entitled to overtime under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, while non-exempt employees can qualify for this pay. 
Employee Records 
General 
An employee's personnel file consists of the employee's employment application, withholding 
fonns, reference checks, emergency infonnation and any performance appraisals, benefits data or 
other appropriate employment-related documents. 
It is the employee's responsibility to notify the Payroll Dep"8rtment or Human Resources of any 
changes in name, address, telephone number, marital status, number of dependents, military 
service status, beneficiaries or person to notify in case of an accident. 
Misrepresentation of an·y fact which you have provided infonnation for on your application, in 
your personnel :file, or any other document is sufficient reason for dismissal. Personnel records 
are considered company property and are not available for review by employees. 
An original personnel file consists of an employee's employment application, withholding fonns, 
reference checks, emergency information and any performance appraisals, benefits data and 
other appropriate employment-related documents. 
It is your responsibility to notify the Payroll or Human Resources department of any changes in 
name, address, telephone number, marital status, number of dependents, military service status, 
beneficiaries or person to notify in case of an accident. 
You may be dismissed for misrepresenting any fact on your application or in your personnel file. 
Personnel records are considered company property. You may review and make copies of your 
record in the Staffing offices after giving adequate notice. 
Introductory ffrainlng) Period 
The first 90 days of employment are an Introductory Period for both the employee and the 
Company. However, during and after this period, the work relationship will remain at will. 
This time period allows you to determine if you have made the right career decision and for 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice to determine whether your initial work perfonnance meets 
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our ll!!~d~. Y_oJ!f manager will monitor .)!IDII ::wo.rk performance~ attitude_arui attendance during 
this time, and be available to answer any questions or concerns you may have about your new 
job. 
The Introductory Period may be extended at management's discretion. 
Reference/Background Checks 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice conducts reference and background checks on all new 
employees. Employees who have falsified information on their employment applications will be 
disciplined, which could include termination. Applicants who have provided false information 
may be eliminated from further consideration for employment. 
Termination, Resignation and Discharge 
General 
Unless expressly proscribed by statute or contract, employment with HeartWood Home Health & 
Hospice is on an 11at will" basis and may be terminated with or without cause or notice. 
Similarly, employees are free to resign their employment at any time. If at any time it is 
necessary for an employee to resign his or her employment with the Company, Heartwood Home 
Health & Hospice requests at least two weeks' notice. Failure to provide notice may lead to 
forfeiture of accrued vacation or other benefits at the discretion of Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice. 
Any employee who is discharged by Heartwood Home Health & Hospice shall be paid only 
wages accrued to the effective date of the separation. 
Sate1y & Emergencv 
Safety 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice is committed to maintaining a safe and healthy environment 
for all employees. Report all accidents, injuries, potential safety hazards, safety suggestions and 
health and safety related issues immediately to your manager. 
If you or another employee is injured, contact your supervisor or manager immediately. Seek 
help fro in outside emergency response agencies, if needed. Contact information is posted in the 
Office Kitchen. 
You must complete an Employee's Claim for Worker's Compensation Benefits Form if you have 
an injury that requires medical attention. If your inquiry does not require medical attention, you 
must still complete a Supervisor and Employee Report of Accident Form in case medical 
treatment is later needed and to ensure that any existing safety hazards are corrected. You can 
obtain the required forms from Staffing. 
A federal law, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, requires that we keep records of all 
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illnesses and accidents that occur on the job. OSHA also provides for your right to know about 
any heaJth hazards which might be present on the job. 
In addition, the state Workers' Compensation Act aJso requires that you report any illness or 
injury caused by the workplace, no matter how slight. If you do not report an injury, you may 
jeopardize your right to collect workers' compensation payments as well as health benefits. 
You can get the required reporting paperwork from Staffing. 
Security 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice is committed to ensuring employees' security. Our premises 
are equipped with both security alarms that are active outside working hours and a fire alann 
system. If you have a security concern or need more information about operating these systems, 
contact Staffing. 
All employees are given identification cards when they join the Company. Wear your ID at all 
times while on Company business, whetjl.~r yo1:1 ~.e gn or off Company premises. If you leave 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice, you must surrender your ID and any company keys you 
h~ve been issued. 
Emergency Measures {Inclement Weather) 
We realize that bad weather or hazardous commuting conditions may occasionally make it 
impossible for employees to report to work on time. 
However, you are expected to make a diligent effort to report to work when conditions have 
improved. If you determine that you are unable to report to work because of the conditions, 
inform your supervisor as soon as possible. Your absence will be charged to personal or vacation 
time. 
!fit becomes necessary to shut down the office due to weather or other emergency, every effort 
will be made to notify employees. If there is a question as to whether the office will be open, call 
your place of work. If there is no answer within one hour after the normal start time, assume the 
office is closed. 
Corporate Communicatio·ns & Technology 
Use of Company Communication Systems 
Because Heartwood Home Health & Hospice reserves the right to access any personal 
corrununication without prior notice, employees should not use company systems to transmit any 
messages or to access any information that they would not want a third party to hear or see. 
Although incidental and occasional personal use of the company's systems is pennjtted, any such 
personal use will be treated the same as all other communications under this policy. However, 
employees are at all times prohibited from accessing or downloading information from the 
Internet for personal use or from playing any sort of Internet or computer games on company 




'foe telephone system (including voicemail) at Heartwood Home Health & Hospice is the 
property of the company and is provided for business purposes. Heartwood Home Health & 
Hospice may periodically monitor the usage of the telephone systems to ensure compliance with 
this policy. TI1erefore, employees should not consider their conversations on the company's 
telephone system to be private. 
Personal Mail 
All mru! delivered to the company is presumed to be related to company business. Mail sent to 
you at the company will be opened by the office and routed to your department. If you do not 
wish to have your correspondence handled in this manner, please have it delivered to your home. 
Employee Benefits 
Retirement Saving Plan 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice proyjdes a 401(k) retirement savings plan for fulltime 
employees who have completed one year of service and otherwise qualify to participate. The 
plan includes a provision for employee tax deferred compensation contributions. 
You can request a full copy of the plan summary description from Jessica Rockne. 
Worker's Compensation 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice provides insurance to compensate for any illness or injury 
an employee might suffer while working on company premises, traveling on official company 
business, or attending an activity officially sponsored by the Company. If you become ill or 
injured, please get medical attention at once. 
You must also report the details to your supervisor immediately. And you must complete a report 
for every injury, no matter how small, to keep the coverage in force and to get any benefits or 
other compensation to which you may be entitled. 
Holidays 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice observes eight (8) holidays per year. A calendar of these 
holidays will be posted prior to January 151 of that year. 
You will be paid for these holidays if you: 
• are a full-time employee who has met the 90 day training period, and 
• have worked the full day before and the full day after the holiday, unless time off has 
been approved in advance as vacation or personal days. 
• ]f you call in sick the day before or after the holiday, you will not get paid for the 
holiday. 
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• Per visit employees are not eligible for paid holidays. 
Due to business needs, some employees may be required to work on company holidays. Your 
supervisor or manager will notify you if this may apply to you. 
If approved, you may work a scheduled holiday and take another day off within the calendar year 
as a floating holiday. This must be approved by your direct supervisor and the administrator at 
least two weeks in advance. If you do not use the floating holiday within the calendar year, you 
forfeit the day. 
Paid Time Off (PTO) 
Sick pay is pa.id as part of the PTO program. lfyou are sick for more than two days, Heartwood 
requires a note from your physician stating you ate ok to return to work and excusing you from 
the time you missed. lfyou have called in sick, you will stay borne and not take phone calls 
from staff or work from home. 1f you choose to do so, you will do this on your own time. If you 
are sick, stay home and be sick. 
Vacation time is also part of tl1e PTO-program and must be requested at least two weeks in 
advance in an effort to cover staff schedule. All employees must complete a Time-off Request 
Form and submit it to the Office Manager for approval. 
111ere are two paid time off (PTO) tiers: 
Administrative PTO is defined as ·any salaried, hourly, or exempt employee. 
1 Paid Time Off (PTO) - Paid time off is given to full-time employees and begins after the 
90 day training period. ·~ 
2 PTO accrues based on hours worked with a limit of 40 hours per year (.0385 hours 
earned per hour worked). 
3 The accrual begins upon completion of the 90 day training period. 
4 Employees cannot accrue more than 80 PTO hours, the accrual will simply stop. 
5 PTO can be carried over to the next calendar year. 
6 Employees must only take what they have accrued, they cannot go negative. 
7 All requested time off must be approved by management and scheduling a minimum of 
two weeks in advance. 
8 Sick days will be paid at part of the PTO program. 
9 PTO does not apply to overtime calculation. 
10 PTO will not be paid out upon termination of employment. 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice reserves the right not to approve a vacation request if it will 
interfere with Company operations or adversely affect coverage of job and staff requirements. 
Whenever possible, employees1 requests for vacation will be accommodated, but where 
scheduling conflicts arise, seniority will prevail. 
Clerical/Per Visit PTO is defined as per visit, non-exempt employee and field staff that is paid 
on a per visit or per diem basis. 
1 Paid Time Off (PTO)-Paid time off after one year of service. 
Last Updated 12116/2011 12 :41 PM 038~ 
1--· 
2 PTO accrues based on hours worked wit11 a limit of40-hours p~r year (.Q19J-bours 
earned per hour worked). 
3 The accrual begins upon completion of t11e one year training period. 
4 Employees cannot accrue more than 40 PTO hours, the accrual wil1 simply stop. 
5 PTO can be carried over to the next calendar year. 
6 Employees must only talce what they have accrued, they cannot go negative. 
7 All requested time off must be approved by management and scheduling a minimwn of 
two weeks in advance. 
8 Sick days will be paid nt part of the PTO program. 
9 PTO will not be paid out upon termination of employment. 
10 PTO cannot go negative 
Heartwood Home Health & Hospice reserves the right not to approve a vacation request if it will 
interfere with Company operations or adversely affect coverage of job and staff requirements. 
Whenever possible, employees' requests for vacation will be accommodated, but where 
scheduling conflicts arise, seniority will prevail. 
Medical Reimbursement 
Medical reimbursement is offered to full-time employees for a total of $1200 per year; full-time 
is defined as working at least 35 hours per week. Part time employees will receive $600 per 
year; part time is defined as working at least 15 hours per week. Qualifying expenses can be 
found under IRS guidelines for medical deductions. You qualify for this benefit if you have met 
the 90 day training period. 111e arnoWit of the reimbursement is prorated from the first day after 
the end of your training period. For example, if this day is Oct 12, the annual limit for expenses 
can only be $261.29 ($61 .29 for 19 days in Octo her and $100 in November and December, half 
of this for part-time employees). 
All receipts must be dated after the last day of the training period, and all receipts must be turned 
in no later than five (5) days prior to your last day on the job. 
All receipts must be submitted after the end of the month in which the expense was incurred. No 
expenses will be all owe~. after the end of the quarter. For example: 
• January through Mar~h claims must be submitted by April 30. 
• April through June claims must be submitted by July 31. 
• July through September claims must be submitted by October 31. 
• October through December claims must be submitted by January 31 of the following 
year. 
Education Reimbursement 
Education reirn\:rnrsement is offered to full time employees in the amount of $1200 per year; 
$600 ]Jer year for part-time employees. If the· employee terminates their employment with 
Heartwood within one year after the education reimbursement has been made, they must return 
the funds paid on their behalf back to Heartwood. 
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Meeting, Email, Text & Phone Etiquette 
Meetings 
I. Be on time (On time is two minutes early) 
2. Meetings are the priority (unless it is an absolute emergency!) 
3. Be considerate of others in the meeting. 
a. Please put your cell phone on vibrate. . 
b. Don't leave to take a call unless an absolute emergency. 
c. No texting. 
d. Don't start side conversations. 
e. Listen to what is being said so we don't say it again. 
4. Please no SCT's or JAVA's (Short cuts and Acronyms) 
5. Be prepared 
a. Are you out this week? 
b. Are you gone next week? 
c. What is your schedule? Do you have it with you? 
i. Do you have a list of your patients with you? 
d. Do you have a pen and paper for notes? 
6. Get supplies after the meeting if it means you 're going to be late to the meeting. 
7. Please talk about pertinent infonnation in the meeting. Don't wait to have a meeting after 
the meeting. If your information is detailed and for a smaller staff we will schedule a 
side-meeting during the main meeting. 
Email 
1. ALL CAPS IN AN EMAIL IS YELLING! 
2. If you are copied it is informational and you don't need to respond. 
3. If is not required for you to respond to afterhours emaiJ. It will be sitting there for you the 
next day. 
4. Respond ta all email. With a minimum ofl got your email. 
Text 
1. Please respond to an 'all staff text that requires a response. 
a. Please cancel tomorrow's visit for Patient Jones. Please respond 
b. Can you pick up a visit? Please respond 
c. Patient Smith Passed away. Not necessary to respond 
2. Do you want texts on your day off? 
Phone 
1. Listen to your voicemail before you call the person back. 
2. When you leave a voicemail give some detail. Not, "Please call me". 
3. When you call the office, "I'm returning Lee's call". 
4. When you call field staff please say something like, "Hi this is Lee, please call me at your 
earliest convenience to talk about Patient Smith". 
5. Please respond to your voice mail. If it is your day off, please respond at your earliest 
convenience. 
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Calls after hours 
1. Phone calls and texts should not be made to staff members outside of the 9-5 working 
hours. 
1. If you have something that must be resolved after hours, please call the office number to 
reach the on call nurse. 
2. If you have something you want to communicate to someone specific, please email that 
person so tbey will receive it the next day. 
Email (and text) Communication 
Sometimes communicating in email and text cart be difficult because you cannot convey the 
proper emotions and your words may not come across the way you intended. Here are a few 
rules to follow to help. When usjng only words does not work, call U1e person to make sure they 
understand you are sympathetic or understanding. 
1. Take Another Look Before You Hit Send 
With email, what can be misunderstood will be misunderstood. That's why you should be 
doubly careful with everything you write. One strategy to avoid misinterpretations is to 
allow every message at least some minutes of rest after you have finished it before you send. 
Reread and reconsider the whole message when you return to it, possibly from the recipient's 
perspective. Short and simple emails can be vague and the recipient may be uncertain of 
your intended meaning_ 
2. Do Let People Know Their Mail Has Been Received 
Sometimes, emails get lost or fall prey to overeager spam filtering. When you get an email or 
text, please respond that you received it; especially with patient's care at stake. Even a 
simple, "ok" or "yes" is fine. This helps everyone know that you got the message and you 
understand. If someone asks you to do something, please let them know you've completed 
the task with a simple, "done". 
Even if you do plan to reply later, an email acknowledging receipt and Jetting the sender 
know when you will get back to them can be welcome. 
If we send a mass text to see if you can help with picking up a patient, pJease text back "no". 
This way I know you received the text, and can move on. 
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Acknowledgement of receipt and understanding-Employee Copy 
I acknowledge that I have received the Heartwood Home Health & Hospice Employee 
Handbook and that I have read and understand the policies. 
I understand that this Handbook represents only current policies and benefits, and that it does not 
create a contract of employment. Heartwood Home Health & Hospice retains the right to change 
these policies and benefits, as it deems advisable. 
Unless expressly proscribed by statute or contract, my employment is "at will." I understand that 
I have the right to tenninate my employment at any time, with or without cause or notice, and 
that the Company has the same right. I further understand that my status as an "at will" 
employee may not be changed except in writing and signed by the President of the Company. 
l understand that the irifonnation I come into contact with during my employment is proprietary 
to the Company and accordingly, I agree to keep it confidential, which means I will not use it 
other than in the performance of my duties or disclose it to any person or entity outside the 
Company. I understand that I must comply with all of the provisions of the Handbook to have 
access to and use Company resources. I also understand that ifl do not comply with all ... _ 
provisions of the Handbook, my access to Company resources may be revoked, and I may be 
subject to disciplinary action up to arid including discharge. 
I forther understand that I am obligated to familiarize myself with the Company's safety, health, 





Please Print Your Name 
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STATE RULES 
UT AH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART lII. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
URCP Rule 11 (2013) 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations to court; sanctions 
(a) Signature. 
Page I 
(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney ofrecord or, if the 
party is not represented by the party. 
(2) A person may sign a paper using any fonn of signature recognized by law as binding. Unless required by 
statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule 
requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. Ifa statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature and 
the party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16. 
(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called 
to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. -- By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief, fanned after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or need-
less increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are 
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
( 4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasona-
bly based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. -- If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) 
has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attor-
neys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. -- A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or 
requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 
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URCP Rule 11 
5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court.unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other 
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not with-
drawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable 
expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may 
be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(B) On court's initiative. -- On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific con-
duct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not 
violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. -- A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is 
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limita-
tions in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order 
to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment 
to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the viola-
tion. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b )(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show 
cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys --
are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. -- When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a viola-
tion of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. 
HISTORY: Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1997; April 1, 2008; April 1, 2013 
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. -- The 1997 amendments conform state Rule 11 with federal Rule 11. One differ-
ence between the rules concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible for violations by a member of the firm. Federal 
Rule 11 ( c)(l )(A) states: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, associates, and employees." Under the federal rule, joint responsibility is presumed unless the 
judge determines not to impose joint responsibility. State Rule l l(c)(l)(A) provides: "In appropriate circumstances, a 
law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees." Under the 
state rule, joint responsibility is not presumed, and the judge may impose joint responsibility in appropriate circum-
stances. What constitutes appropriate circumstances is left to the discretion of the judge, but might include: repeated 
violations, especially after earlier sanctions; firm-wide sanctionable practices; or a sanctionable practice approved by a 
supervising attorney and committed by a subordinate. 
Amendment Notes. --The 2013 amendment deleted subdivision (d), which read: "Inapplicability to discovery. Sub-
divisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and mo-
tions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37." 
Compiler's Notes. -- This rule is substantially similar to Rule I 1, F.R. C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Adoption proceeding. 
Amendment of complaint. 
Amount of sanctions. 
Appeals. 
Attorney fees. 
Bad faith not found. 
Due process. 
Hearing. 
Imposition of sanctions. 
Nature of duty imposed. 
Reasonable inquiry. 




-- Question of law. 
-- Sanctions. 




URCP Rule 11 
In an adoption proceeding, the trial court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions against attorney who failed to 
make reasonable inquiry into existing law, made allegations in the amended petition that were not well grounded in fact, 
failed to obtain a preplacement adoptive study or temporary placement order, failed to comply with the Interstate Com-
pact on the Placement of Children, knew or should have known the natural mother's consent was flawed, knew the nat-
ural father would not consent to the adoption, and failed to make a reasonable inquiry as to whether the natural father's 
parental rights were terminable. Giffen v. R. WL., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Amendment of complaint. 
Amendment by an attorney of the facts stated in a complaint was sufficient to establish those facts as they would 
have been by a verified complaint before the changes made by this rule making verification unnecessary. Calder v. 
Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954). 
Amount of sanctions. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying certain attorney's fees and costs in an award of sanctions under this 
rule after it considered the amount of work necessary to defend the claims presented and dee! ined to award the defend-
ant for work and costs it believed were not required. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998). 
Appeals. 
After voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs, the trial court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce sanctions under this rule 
did not legally prejudice plaintiffs and there was no final appealable order. Barton v Utah Transit Auth., 872P.2d1036 
(Utah 1994). 
Attorney ft:t:s. 
Because any factual errors made by petitioner's counsel were insignificant, there was no violation of this rule. Ac-
cordingly, when petitioner's counsel successfully opposed the motion for sanctions against him, he was properly 
awarded fees as the prevailing party. K.F.K. v. T W, 2005 UT App 85, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 110 P. 3d 162. 
Petitioner's counsel, having prevailed on the motion for Rule 11 sanctions against him, was entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Having received fees below and having prevailed on appeal, petitioner's counsel 
was entitled to attorney's fees incurred on appeal. K.F.K. v. T W., 2005 UT App 85, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 110 P. 3d 
162. 
It was within the district court's discretion to award appellee personal representative additional fees incurred in liti-
gating the amount of reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal after appellant filed a petition to remove the personal 
representative that was brought without merit and not in good faith and failed to demonstrate that the district court 
abused its discretion in awarding additional fees on remand. Ninow v Copier (Jn re Estate of Pahl), 2011 UT App 56, 
249 P.3d 567. 
Bad faith not found. 
Debt collector's actions clearly complied with this rule; as a Utah attorney, the collector had a good faith basis to file 
suit seeking shoplifting fees for a bounced check where 1) he pleaded in the alternative for fees permitted under the 
bounced check statute; 2) several state court judges had previously assessed shoplifting fees for bounced checks; and 3) 
the Utah Supreme Court had never addressed the issue. Johnson v. Riddle, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. Utah 2003). 
Due process. 
Before imposing sanctions on a party under this rule, due process requires that the party receive adequate notice and 
an opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing; a formal evidentiary hearing is not required, however. Gildea v. 
Guardian Title Co., 2001UT75, 31P.3d543. 
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When a court considers sanctions on its own initiative, due process requirements are met by issuing an order direct-
ing the attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated this rule, and allowing the party a reasonable 
time in which to file a response. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, 31 P.3d 543. 
Hearing. 
Trial court did not demonstrate bias in holding a hearing under this rule on its own motion; as required, the court 
described the conduct that appeared to violate the rule and offered the affected party an opportunity to demonstrate that 
the court's concerns were unfounded. Edwards v. Powder Mt. Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 214P.3d120. 
Imposition of sanctions. 
In awarding attorney fees against the party making a meritless motion to disqualify, trial judge did not purport to act 
under this rule, but rather exercised the court's inherent powers to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney for wasting 
judicial resources. Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255. 
Trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to defendant as a sanction against plaintiff whose brief was extraordinar-
ily deficient. Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 90 P. 3d 649. 
A movant must strictly comply with the requirement in this rule that a motion for sanctions be served on opposing 
counsel as a precondition to filing the motion with the court. Barnard v. Mansell, 2009 UT App 298, 221P.3d874. 
When husband filed a second motion to disqualify the judge for the purpose of delay so his new attorney could pre-
pare, the motion was filed for improper purposes and was factually meritless, both of which were independent grounds 
for sanctions. (Unpublished decision.) Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, 702 Utah Adv. Rep: 13, 271P:3d837. 
Nature of duty imposed. 
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the attorney's private duty to 
represent a client's interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 821P.2d1146 (Utah 1991). 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Certification by an attorney "that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable in-
quiry the complaint is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing Jaw" does not require him to obtain a favorable 
expert medical opinion before filing a medical malpractice action. Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Under this rule, a party need not have reached the correct conclusion; he need only have made a reasonable inquiry. 
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993). 
Because attorney's reading of the law as it existed when he commenced his action was at least plausible, sanctions 
under this rule were not warranted. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993). 
Sanctions were proper under this rule against attorney who made misrepresentations of fact before the district court, 
having failed to make an inquiry into the facts that was reasonable under the circumstances. Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 
86, 15P.3d 1021. 
Sanctions not warranted. 
On motions to impose sanctions against plaintiff Utah State Bar filed by defendants engaged in practice of public 
adjusting and based on the grounds that (1) the original complaint named as plaintiff the "Board of Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar" instead of the "Utah State Bar," (2) there were no facts to support the claim that one defendant was 
engaged in public adjusting, and (3) there was no basis in the law to support the Bar's assertion in its original complaint 
that first-party adjusting constituted the unauthorized practice oflaw, motions were properly denied since the misnomer 
of plaintiff in the original complaint was a technical error which did not cause defendants any prejudice and was cor-
rected in the Bar's amended complaint, since Bar counsel had evidence that defendants were engaged in public adjust-
ing, and since law as to first-party adjusting was unsettled. Utah State Bar v. Sorensen, 910 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1996). 
Where a party's request that the trial court interpret the terms of a divorce decree was neither meritless nor objec-
tively unreasonable under the circumstances, sanctions were not warranted. Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
A purported factual finding, drafted by counsel for the prevailing party, simply paraphrasing the language of this 
Rule, without any detailed factual findings particularizing its conclusions, did not support the imposition of sanctions. 
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255. 
Upon finding ethical violation by attorney in holding improper ex parte conversation with employee of opposing 
party, and improper refusal to produce transcript of conversation when requested, court could not impose sanctions un-
der this rule without finding that attorney had violated this rule and affording attorney notice and an opportunity to re-
spond. The correct remedy was an award, under R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), of the costs and attorney fees incurred by opposing 
party in obtaining an order to produce the transcript. Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, 3 4 P. 3d 194. 
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A ward of sanctions was not appropriate against a party who advanced an argument that was inventive but not entire-
ly frivolous; the party pointed to cases from other jurisdictions to support its position and gave the court the opportunity 
to clarify a rule. Aurora Credit Servs v Liberty West Dev., Inc .. 2007 UT App 327, 171 P.3d 465. 
Sanctions warranted. 
The sanction of attorney's fees was proper under this rule where a plaintiff brought an action to force an automobile 
insurer to pay unreasonable and unnecessary medical expenses for alleged injuries suffered in a car accident for the 
purpose of making the plaintiffs medical expenses exceed the personal injury protection cap of§ 31 A-22-308, existing 
contract law precluded the plaintiff from recovering such medical expenses against the insurer, and evidence established 
that the plaintiffs attorney's primary motive in pursuing the claims was to collect attorney's fees. Pennington v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998). 
Signature requirement. 
This rule, as in effect in 1973, did not supersede a statutory requirement that objections to a proposed water-rights 
determination be duly verified on oath. Penta Creeks, LLC v. Olds (Jn re General Determination of Rights to the Use uf 
Water), 2008 UT 25, 182 P.3d 362 
Violation. 
-- Question of Jaw. 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of this rule is a question oflaw. Taylor v. Estate ofTaylur, 770 P.2d 
163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811P.2d202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
-- Sanctions. 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the particular case. Taylor v. 
Estate ofT.aylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Giffen v. R. WL., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Bailey-Allen 
Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Trial court erred in imposing sanctions in its final order without affording plaintiff a hearing or any other opportunity 
to respond. Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
-- -- Attorney fees. 
Attaching the wrong document to a complaint violated this rule because a reasonable inquiry would have revealed 
the mistake; award of attorney fees was appropriate because the error caused defendants to incur legal expense in re-
searching the validity of an irrelevant document and preparing a motion to dismiss based on it. Taylor v. Estate of Tay-
lor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A ward of costs and attorney fees was an appropriate sanction for attempting to go forward with a class action that, in 
light of the complete resolution of the matter eleven months prior, was "unconscionable and beyond reason." Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Award of attorney fees to landowners against adjacent landowners, on the basis that the adjacent landowners acted in 
bad faith by seeking attorney fees from landowners after obtaining a quitclaim deed from landowner for the disputed 
property, could not be supported under this rule, because when adjacent landowners filed their claim there was there 
was no clear prohibition on the recovery of attorney fees in undisputed quiet title actions and finding was not made as to 
bad faith on part of the adjacent landowner. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Because submission of voluminous affidavits containing testimony that could easily have been introduced at trial is 
not authorized by existing law, the trial court did not err in awarding attorney fees to the other party. Hudema v. Car-
penter, 1999 UT App 290, 989 P.2d 491 
-- Standard. 
Sanctions were improper against an attorney, where opposing parties conceded that no particular document was 
signed in violation of the rule, but simply argued that even if the attorney believed the case was well grounded when he 
filed the complaint, he should have known after he met with counsel for defendants that the case could not go forward. 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811P.2d202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Utah appellate courts should use the three-standard approach in reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 findings. This ap-
proach includes: (1) reviewing the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing the 
trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal conclusions under the correction of 
error standard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanction to be imposed 
under the abuse of discretion standard. Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992); Giffen v. R. W.L.. 913 P.2d 761 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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The determination of whether conduct violates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis. Giffen v. R. WL., 913 P.2d 761 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; its conclusion that this rule was violat-
ed is reviewed under a correction of error standard; and the court's determination as to the type and amount of sanctions 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255. 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d I 20J (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841P.2d709 (Utah Ct. App. J992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah Ct. App. J998); Stavros v. Office of Legislative Research & Gen. 
Counsel, 2000 UT 63, J 5 P. 3d I 013; Mi Vida Enters. v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App 400, 122 P.3d 144; Workers Comp. 
Fundv. Argonaut Ins. Co., 2011 UT61 , 266 P.3d 792. 
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Rule 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 
Rule 11. Signing Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to the Court; 
Sanctions 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in the attorney's name-Dr by a party personally if the party is 
unrepresented. The paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone number. 
Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or 
accompanied by an affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is 
promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or party's attention. 
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper-whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an attorney or 
umepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 
( 1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing 
new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery; and 
( 4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. 
(c) Sanctions. 
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that Rule 11 (b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on 
any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent 
exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed 
by its partner, associate, or employee. 
(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other 
motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11 (b ). The motion 
must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the 
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected 
within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may 
award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred for the 
motion. 
(3) On the Court's Initiative. On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or 
party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11 (b ). 
( 4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what 
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The 
sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed 
on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of 
part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the 
violation. 
(5) Limitations on Monetary Sanctions. The court must not impose a monetary sanction: 
(A) against a represented party for violating Rule 1 l(b)(2); or 
(B) on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule 1 l(c)(3) before 
voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose 
attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(6) Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a sanction must describe the 
sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction. 
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. This rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery 
requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37. 
Notes 
(As amended Apr. 28, 1983, eff. Aug. 1, 1983; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 
1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.) 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1937 
This is substantially the content of [former] Equity Rules 24 (Signature of Counsel) and 
21 (Scandal and Impertinence) consolidated and unified. Compare [former] Equity Rule 36 
(Officers Before Whom Pleadings Verified). Compare to similar purposes, English Rules Under 
the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 19, r. 4, and Great Australian Gold Mining 
Co. v. Martin, L. R., 5 Ch.Div. 1, 10 (1877). Subscription of pleadings is required in many codes. 
2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) §9265; N.Y.R.C.P. (1937) Rule 91; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913) 
§7455. 
This rule expressly continues any statute which requires a pleading to be verified or 
accompanied by an affidavit, such as: 
U.S.C., Title 28: 
§381 [former] (Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders) 
§762 [now 1402] (Suit against the United States). 
U.S.C., Title 28, §829 [now 1927] (Costs; attorney liable for, when) is unaffected by this 
rule. 
For complaints which must be verified under these rules, see Rules 23(b) (Secondary 
Action by Shareholders) and 65 (Injunctions). 
For abolition of the rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be 
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating 
circumstances, see Pa.Stat.Ann. (Purdon, 1931) see 12P.S.Pa.,§1222; for the rule in equity 
itself, see Greenfield v. Blumenthal, 69 F.2d 294 (C.C.A. 3d, 1934). 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1983 Amendment 
Since its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the striking of pleadings and the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in the signing of pleadings. Its provisions 
have always applied to motions and other papers by virtue of incorporation by reference in Rule 
7(b)(2). The amendment and the addition of Rule 7(b)(3) expressly confirms this applicability. 
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses. See 
6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §1334 (1971). There has been 
considerable confusion as to ( 1) the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or 
motion or taking disciplinary action, '(2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign 
pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions. See Rodes, 
Ripple & Mooney, Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
64-65, Federal Judicial Center (1981). The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of 
courts to impose sanctions, see Moore, Federal Practice 
7.05, at 1547, by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those 
obligations by the imposition of sanctions. 
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building upon and expanding the 
equitable doctrine permitting the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant 
whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See, e.g., Roadway 
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, (1980); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Greater attention 
by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when 
appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation 
process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses. 
The expanded nature of the lawyer's certification in the fifth sentence of amended Rule 11 
recognizes that the litigation process may be abused for purposes other than delay. See, e.g., 
Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977). 
The words "good ground to support" the pleading in the original rule were interpreted to 
have both factual and legal elements. See, e.g., Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General 
Motors Corp., 15 Fed.R.Serv. 2d 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). They have been replaced by a 
standard of conduct that is more focused. 
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the 
law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness 
under the circumstances. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F.Supp. 
975 (E.D.Pa. 1973). This standard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus 
it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation. See Nemeroff v. 
Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980). 
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual 
or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test 
the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, 
or other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such 
factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on 
a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether 
the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he 
depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar. 
The rule does not require a party or an attorney to disclose privileged communications or 
work product in order to show that the signing of the pleading, motion, or other paper is 
substantially justified. The provisions of Rule 26(c), including appropriate orders after in camera 
inspection by the court, remain available to protect a party claiming privilege or work product 
protection. 
Amended Rule 11 continues to apply to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or other 
paper. Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves 
to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special 
circumstances that often arise in prose situations. See Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 
The provision in the original rule for striking pleadings and motions as sham and false 
has been deleted. The passage has rarely been utilized, and decisions thereunder have tended to 
confuse the issue of attorney honesty with the merits of the action. See generally Risinger, 
Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 , 61 
Minn.L.Rev. 1 (1976). Motions under this provision generally present issues better dealt with 
under Rules 8, 12, or 56. See Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 5 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §1334 (1969). 
The former reference to the inclusion of scandalous or indecent matter, which is itself 
strong indication that an improper purpose underlies the pleading, motion, or other paper, also 
has been deleted as unnecessary. Such matter may be stricken under Rule 12(f) as well as dealt 
with under the more general language of amended Rule 11. 
The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that efforts to obtain 
enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that the rule will be applied when properly invoked. The 
word "sanctions" in the caption, for example, stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing with 
improper pleadings, motions or other papers. This corresponds to the approach in imposing 
sanctions for discovery abuses. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 
U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiarn). And the words "shall impose" in the last sentence focus the court's 
attention on the need to impose sanctions for pleading and motion abuses. The court, however, 
retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion 
to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted. 
The reference in the former text to wilfullness as a prerequisite to disciplinary action has 
been deleted. However, in considering the nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the 
court should take account of the state of the attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge 
when the pleading or other paper was signed. Thus, for example, when a party is not represented 
by counsel, the absence of legal advice is an appropriate factor to be considered. 
Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their own motion. See 
North American Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 73 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Authority to do so 
has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene 
unless requested by one of the parties. The detection and punishment of a violation of the signing 
requirement, encouraged by the amended rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing the 
system's effective operation. 
If the duty imposed by the rule is violated, the court should have the discretion to impose 
sanctions on either the attorney, the party the signing attorney represents, or both, or on an 
unrepresented party who signed the pleading, and the new rule so provides. Although Rule 11 
has been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power to impose sanctions on an attorney 
personally, either by imposing costs or employing the contempt technique. See 5 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969); 2A Moore, Federal Practice 
11.02, at 2104 n.8. This power has been used infrequently. The amended rule should eliminate 
any doubt as to the propriety of assessing sanctions against the attorney. 
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may be appropriate 
under the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on the client. See Browning Debenture 
Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., supra. This modification brings Rule 11 in line with 
practice under Rule 3 7, which allows sanctions for abuses during discovery to be imposed upon 
the party, the attorney, or both. 
A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the offending party 
promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so. The time when sanctions are to be imposed rests 
in the discretion of the trial judge. However, it is anticipated that in the case of pleadings the 
sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the end of the litigation, and in the 
case of motions at the time when the motion is decided or shortly thereafter. The procedure 
obviously must comport with due process requirements. The particular format to be followed 
should depend on the circumstances of the situation and the severity of the sanction under 
consideration. In many situations the judge's participation in the proceedings provides him with 
full knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry will be necessary. 
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading 
regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the 
court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record. Thus, 
discovery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary 
circumstances. 
Although the encompassing reference to "other papers" in new Rule 11 literally includes 
discovery papers, the certification requirement in that context is governed by proposed new Rule 
26(g). Discovery motions, however, fall within the ambit of Rule 11. 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1987 Amendment 
The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended. 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1993 Amendment 
Purpose of revision. This revision is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the 
interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule. For empirical examination of 
experience under the 1983 rule, see, e.g., New York State Bar Committee on Federal Courts, 
Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees (1987); T. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process (1989); 
American Judicature Society, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 (S. Burbank ed., 1989); E. Wiggins, T. Willging, and D. Stienstra, Report on Rule 
11 (Federal Judicial Center 1991). For book-length analyses of the case law, see G. Joseph, 
Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse (1989); J. Solovy, The Federal Law of Sanctions 
(1991); G. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventive Measures (1991). 
The rule retains the principle that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to the 
court to refrain from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1. The revision broadens the scope 
of this obligation, but places greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions and should reduce 
the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court. New subdivision (d) removes from 
the ambit of this rule all discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions subject to the 
provisions of Rule 26 through 3 7. 
Subdivision (a). Retained in this subdivision are the provisions requiring signatures on 
pleadings, written motions, and other papers. Unsigned papers are to be received by the Clerk, 
but then are to be stricken if the omission of the signature is not corrected promptly after being 
called to the attention of the attorney or pro se litigant. Correction can be made by signing the 
paper on file or by submitting a duplicate that contains the signature. A court may require by 
local rule that papers contain additional identifying information regarding the parties or attorneys, 
such as telephone numbers to facilitate facsimile transmissions, though, as for omission of a 
signature, the paper should not be rejected for failure to provide such information. 
The sentence in the former rule relating to the effect of answers under oath is no longer 
needed and has been eliminated. The provision in the former rule that signing a paper constitutes 
a certificate that it has been read by the signer also has been eliminated as unnecessary. The 
obligations imposed under subdivision (b) obviously require that a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper be read before it is filed or submitted to the court. 
Subdivisions (b) and (c). These subdivisions restate the provisions requiring attorneys and 
pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, 
written motions, and other documents, and prescribing sanctions for violation of these 
obligations. The revision in part expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while 
providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule 
continues to require litigants to "stop-and-think" before initially making legal or factual 
contentions. It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential 
sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable and by generally providing 
protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is 
called to their attention. 
The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the 
court. It does not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the court, 
when counsel may make statements that would not have been made if there had been more time 
for study and reflection. However, a litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of these 
papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but 
include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and 
motions after learning that they cease to have any merit. For example, an attorney who during a 
pretrial conference insists on a claim or defense should be viewed as "presenting to the court" 
that contention and would be subject to the obligations of subdivision (b) measured as of that 
time. Similarly, if after a notice of removal is filed, a party urges in federal court the allegations 
of a pleading filed in state court (whether as claims, defenses, or in disputes regarding removal or 
remand), it would be viewed as "presenting"-and hence certifying to the district court under 
Rule 11-those allegations. 
The certification with respect to allegations and other factual contentions is revised in 
recognition that sometimes a litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is true or false 
but may need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or third persons to gather and 
confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation. Tolerance of factual contentions in initial 
pleadings by plaintiffs or defendants when specifically identified as made on information and 
belief does not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into 
the facts that is reasonable under the circumstances; it is not a license to join parties, make 
claims, or present defenses without any factual basis or justification. Moreover, if evidentiary 
support is not obtained after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the 
party has a duty under the rule not to persist with that contention. Subdivision (b) does not 
require a formal amendment to pleadings for which evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather 
calls upon a litigant not thereafter to advocate such claims or defenses. 
The certification is that there is (or likely will be) "evidentiary support" for the allegation, 
not that the party will prevail with respect to its contention regarding the fact. That summary 
judgment is rendered against a party does not necessarily mean, for purposes of this certification, 
that it had no evidentiary support for its position. On the other hand, if a party has evidence with 
respect to a contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment based 
thereon, it would have sufficient "evidentiary support" for purposes of Rule 11. 
Denials of factual contentions involve somewhat different considerations. Often, of 
course, a denial is premised upon the existence of evidence contradicting the alleged fact. At 
other times a denial is permissible because, after an appropriate investigation, a party has no 
information concerning the matter or, indeed, has a reasonable basis for doubting the credibility 
of the only evidence relevant to the matter. A party should not deny an allegation it knows to be 
true; but it is not required, simply because it lacks contradictory evidence, to admit an allegation 
that it believes is not true. 
The changes in subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) will serve to equalize the burden of the rule 
upon plaintiffs and defendants, who under Rule 8(b) are in effect allowed to deny allegations by 
stating that from their initial investigation they lack sufficient information to form a belief as to 
the truth of the allegation. If, after further investigation or discovery, a denial is no longer 
warranted, the defendant should not continue to insist on that denial. While sometimes helpful, 
formal amendment of the pleadings to withdraw an allegation or denial is not required by 
subdivision (b ). 
Arguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of existing law or for creation of 
new law do not violate subdivision (b)(2) provided they are "nonfrivolous." This establishes an 
objective standard, intended to eliminate any "empty-head pure-heart" justification for patently 
frivolous arguments. However, the extent to which a litigant has researched the issues and found 
some support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through 
consultation with other attorneys should certainly be taken into account in determining whether 
paragraph (2) has been violated. Although arguments for a change of law are not required to be 
specifically so identified, a contention that is so identified should be viewed with greater 
tolerance under the rule. 
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as 
striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring 
participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payahle to the court; 
referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to the 
Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc. See Manual for Complex Litigation, 
Second, §42.3. The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in 
deciding whether to impose a sanction or· what sanctions would be appropriate in the 
circumstances; but, for emphasis, it does specifically note that a sanction may be nonmonetary as 
well as monetary. Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of 
a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one 
particular count or defense; whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; 
whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; 
whether the responsible person is trained in the law; what amount, given the financial resources 
of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what 
amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants: all of these may in a particular case 
be proper considerations. The court has sig~fioant discretion in determining what sanctions, if 
any, should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not be 
more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person 
or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons. 
Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule 
provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a 
penalty. However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for [subdivision] (b)(l) violations, 
deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule 
to make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those 
injured by the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the court, if requested in a motion and if 
so warranted, to award attorney's fees to another party. Any such award to another party, 
however, should not exceed the expenses and attorneys' fees for the services directly and 
unavoidably caused by the violation of the certification requirement. If, for example, a wholly 
unsupportable count were included in a multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose of 
needlessly increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious adversary, any award of expenses 
should be limited to those directly caused by inclusion of the improper count, and not those 
resulting from the filing of the complaint or answer itself. The award should not provide 
compensation for services that could have been avoided by an earlier disclosure of evidence or an 
earlier challenge to the groundless claims or defenses. Moreover, partial reimbursement of fees 
may constitute a sufficient deterrent with respect to violations by persons having modest 
financial resources. In cases brought under statutes providing for fees to be awarded to prevailing 
parties, the court should not employ cost-shifting under this rule in a manner that would be 
inconsistent with the standards that govern the statutory award of fees, such as stated in 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
The sanction should be imposed on the persons-whether attorneys, law firms, or 
parties-who have violated the rule or who may be determined to be responsible for the 
violation. The person signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a document has a nondelegable 
responsibility to the court, and in most situations is the person to be sanctioned for a violation. 
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm is to be held also responsible when, as a result of a 
motion under subdivision ( c )(1 )(A), one of its partners, associates, or employees is determined to 
have violated the rule. Since such a motion may be filed only if the offending paper is not 
withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service of the motion, it is appropriate that the law 
firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible under established principles of agency. This 
provision is designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule. Cf. Pavelic & Leflore v. 
Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989) (1983 version of Rule 11 does not permit 
sanctions against law firm of attorney signing groundless complaint). 
The revision permits the court to consider whether other attorneys in the firm, co-counsel, 
other law firms, or the party itself should be held accountable for their part in causing a violation. 
When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether the 
sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in addition to or, in unusual 
circumstances, instead of the person actually making the presentation to the court. For example, 
such an inquiry may be appropriate in cases involving governmental agencies or other 
institutional parties that frequently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual 
attorneys employed by it. 
Sanctions that involve monetary awards (such as a fine or an award of attorney's fees) 
may not be imposed on a represented party for causing a violation of subdivision (b )(2), 
involving frivolous contentions of law. Monetary responsibility for such violations is more 
properly placed solely on the party's attorneys. With this limitation, the rule should not be subject 
to attack under the Rules Enabling Act. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., __ U.S. __ (1992); 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter. Inc., __ U.S. __ (1991). This 
restriction does not limit the court's power to impose sanctions or remedial orders that may have 
collateral financial consequences upon a party, such as dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a 
defense, or preparation of amended pleadings. 
Explicit provision is made for litigants to be provided notice of the alleged violation and 
an opportunity to respond before sanctions are imposed. Whether the matter should be decided 
solely on the basis of written submissions or should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed, 
for evidentiary presentation) will depend on the circumstances. If the court imposes a sanction, it 
must, unless waived, indicate its reasons in a written order or on the record; the court should not 
ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for sanctions. Whether a violation has occurred 
and what sanctions, if any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the discretion of 
the trial court; accordingly, as under current law, the standard for appellate review of these 
decisions will be for abuse of discretion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 
(1990) (noting, however, that an abuse would be established ifthe court based its ruling on an 
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence). 
The revision leaves for resolution on a case-by-case basis, considering the particular 
circumstances involved, the question as to when a motion for violation of Rule 11 should be 
served and when, if filed, it should be decided. Ordinarily the motion should be served promptly 
after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely. In 
other circumstances, it should not be served until the other party has had a reasonable opportunity 
for discovery. Given the "safe harbor" provisions discussed below, a party cannot delay serving 
its Rule 11 motion until conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the offending contention). 
Rule 11 motions should not be made or threatened for minor, inconsequential violations 
of the standards prescribed by subdivision (b). They should not be employed as a discovery 
device or to test the legal sufficiency or efficacy of allegations in the pleadings; other motions are 
available for those purposes. Nor should Rule 11 motions be prepared to emphasize the merits of 
a party's position, to exact an unjust settlement, to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing 
contentions that are fairly debatable, to increase the costs of litigation, to create a conflict of 
interest between attorney and client, or to seek disclosure of matters otherwise protected by the 
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. As under the prior rule, the court may 
defer its ruling (or its decision as to the identity of the persons to be sanctioned) until final 
resolution of the case in order to avoid immediate conflicts of interest and to reduce the 
disruption created if a disclosure of attorney-client communications is needed to determine 
whether a violation occurred or to identify the person responsible for the violation. 
The rule provides that requests for sanctions must be made as a separate motion, i.e., not 
simply included as an additional prayer for relief contained in another motion. The motion for 
sanctions is not, however, to be filed until at least 21 days (or such other period as the court may 
set) after being served. If, during this period, the alleged violation is corrected, as by withdrawing 
(whether formally or informally) some allegation or contention, the motion should not be filed 
with the com1. These provisions are intended to provide a type of "safe harbor" against motions 
under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's 
motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge 
candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation. Under the 
former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be 
viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the timely withdrawal of a 
contention will protect a party against a motion for sanctions. 
To stress the seriousness of a motion for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct 
claimed to violate the rule, the revision provides that the "safe harbor" period begins to run only 
upon service of the motion. In most cases, however, counsel should be expected to give informal 
notice to the other party, whether in person or by a telephone call or letter, of a potential violation 
before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion. 
As under former Rule 11, the filing of a motion for sanctions is itself subject to the 
requirements of the rule and can lead to sanctions. However, service of a cross motion under 
Rule 11 should rarely be needed since under the revision the court may award to the person who 
prevails on a motion under Rule 11-whether the movant or the target of the motion-reasonable 
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. 
The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with the condition that 
this be done through a show cause order. This procedure provides the person with notice and an 
opportunity to respond. The revision provides that a monetary sanction imposed after a 
court-initiated show cause order be limited to a penalty payable to the court and that it be 
imposed only if the show cause order is issued before any voluntary dismissal or an agreement of 
the parties to settle the claims made by or against the litigant. Parties settling a case should not be 
subsequently faced with an unexpected order from the court leading to monetary sanctions that 
might have affected their willingness tQ settle or voluntarily dismiss a case. Since show cause 
orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of court, the rule 
does not provide a "safe harbor" to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show 
cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative. Such corrective action, however, should 
be taken into account in deciding what-if any-sanction to impose if, after consideration of the 
litigant's response, the court concludes that a violation has occurred. 
Subdivision ( d). Rules 26(g) and 3 7 establish certification standards and sanctions that 
apply to discovery disclosures, requests, responses, objections, and motions. It is appropriate that 
Rules 26 through 3 7, which are specially designed for the discovery process, govern such 
documents and conduct rather than the more general provisions of Rule 11. Subdivision (d) has 
been added to accomplish this result. 
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper presentations of claims, 
defenses, or contentions. It does not supplant statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to 
prevailing parties or alter the principles governing such awards. It does not inhibit the court in 
punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding 
expenses, or directing remedial action authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. §1927. 
See Chambers v. NASCO, __ U.S. __ (1991). Chambers cautions, however, against reliance 
upon inherent powers if appropriate sanctions can be imposed under provisions such as Rule 11, 
and the procedures specified in Rule 11-notice, opportunity to respond, and findings-should 
ordinarily be employed when imposing a sanction under the court's inherent powers. Finally, it 
should be noted that Rule 11 does not preclude a party from initiating an independent action for 
malicious prosecution or abuse of process. 
Committee Notes on Rules-2007 Amendment 
The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil 
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent 
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. 
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